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Since	  its	  inception	  in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  Hizballah,	  the	  Party	  of	  God	  has	  positioned	  itself	  
as	   a	   resistance	   group	   par	   excellence	   in	   the	  Middle	   East,	   establishing	   itself	   as	   the	  
strongest	  non-­‐state	  actor	  in	  the	  region.	  It	  is	  commonly	  defined	  in	  such	  ways	  yet	  very	  
little	  work	  exists	  looking	  at	  the	  application	  of	  religious	  thought	  to	  ideas	  of	  resistance,	  
particularly	  in	  the	  non-­‐Western	  world.	  This	  paper	  does	  not	  seek	  to	  hold	  a	  Shi’a	  form	  
of	  resistance	  up	  as	  against	  Western	  understandings	  of	  the	  term,	  nor	  indeed	  does	  it	  
seek	   to	   establish	   a	   ‘Shi’a	   experience’.	   Rather,	   it	   suggests	   that	   a	   new	   form	   of	  
resistance	   must	   be	   considered	   that	   places	   a	   greater	   onus	   upon	   obligation	   and	  
responsibility,	   achieved	   through	   engaging	   with	   the	   work	   of	   Giorgio	   Agamben,	  
particularly	   the	   concept	   of	   bare	   life.	   In	   testing	   this,	   the	   paper	   explores	   the	  
emergence	  of	  Hizballah	  and	  considers	   the	  group’s	   response	  to	   the	  Syrian	  civil	  war,	  
particularly	   the	  emergence	  of	  Da’ish.	  While	  many	  have	  argued	   that	  Da’ish	  poses	  a	  
serious	   challenge	   to	  Hizballah,	   their	  military	   successes	  across	  Syria	  also	  provide	  an	  
opportunity	   for	   the	   Party	   of	   God	   to	   regain	   legitimacy	   lost	   while	   supporting	   the	  
regime	  of	  Bashar	  al	  Assad	  in	  Syria	  by	  protecting	  the	  Lebanese	  state	  and	  wider	  umma.	  	  
As	  such,	  the	  paper	  seeks	  to	  do	  three	  things:	  first,	  it	  explores	  the	  concept	  of	  bare	  life	  
with	  regard	  to	  explaining	  the	  emergence	  of	  Hizballah;	  second,	  it	  considers	  how	  Shi’a	  
thought	  provides	  scope	  for	  an	  alternative	  understanding	  of	  resistance	  as	  a	   form	  of	  
obligation	   rather	   than	   solely	   as	   a	   response.	   It	   does	   not	   seek	   to	   hold	   this	  
understanding	   up	   against	   understandings	   of	   resistance	   that	   are	   prominent	   within	  
academic	  circles.	   Instead,	   it	  seeks	  to	  argue	  that	  an	  understanding	  of	  resistance	  can	  
be	  found	  within	  Shi’a	  thought	  that	  places	  an	  obligation	  upon	  the	  actor	  to	  act.	  Third,	  
it	  explores	  the	   impact	  of	  Hizballah’s	   involvement	   in	  events	   in	  Syria,	  suggesting	  that	  
this	  involvement	  undermines	  the	  Party	  of	  God’s	  position	  as	  a	  resistance	  organisation	  
while	  also	  being	  complicit	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  bare	  life.	  	  
I	  begin	  by	  offering	  an	  outline	  of	  Giorgio	  Agamben’s	  ideas	  of	  bare	  life	  before	  tracing	  
the	  roots	  of	  Shi’a	  thought,	  with	  a	  particular	  focus	  upon	  the	  Karbala	  Narrative,	  which	  
features	   prominently	   in	   understandings	   of	   resistance.	   The	   paper	   then	   moves	   to	  
consider	   the	   impact	   of	  Da’ish	  upon	  Hizballah	   and	  how	   this	   is	   shaping	   the	  Party	   of	  
God’s	   actions	   across	   the	   Middle	   East.	   It	   suggests	   that	   while	   Hizballah	   is	   rightly	  
concerned	  about	  the	  growth	  of	  Da’ish,	  the	  group	  provides	  an	  opportunity	  to	  regain	  a	  
position	   of	   leadership	   within	   the	  Middle	   East.	   Ultimately	   though,	   in	   Lebanon,	   the	  
Party	   of	   God	   has	   been	   largely	   unable	   to	   change	   perceptions,	   largely	   as	   a	  
consequence	  of	  action	  in	  Syria.	  To	  do	  this,	  I	  engage	  in	  an	  analysis	  of	  Hizballah	  official	  
documents,	  particularly	  the	  Open	  Letter	  and	  the	  2009	  manifesto.	  I	  supplement	  this	  
with	  an	  analysis	  of	  speeches	  given	  by	  prominent	  Hizballah	  members	  in	  the	  summer	  
of	  2014,	  shortly	  after	  the	  emergence	  of	  Da’ish	  in	  Iraq.	  Such	  an	  approach	  allows	  for	  
greater	  awareness	  of	  events	  in	  Lebanon	  in	  Syria	  while	  also	  facilitating	  development	  
of	  the	  concept	  of	  bare	  life.	  
Agamben’s	  Bare	  Life	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As	   Ibn	  Khaldun	  noted	   in	  The	  Muqaddimah,	   politics	   is	   inherently	   about	  people.1	  As	  
such,	  political	  organisation	   is	  about	  the	  organisation	  of	  people.	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  our	  
project	  then	  is	  a	  debate	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  political	  organisation	  and	  its	  relationship	  
with	   sovereignty	   and	   how	   they	   impact	   on	   people.	   Such	   issues	   have	   long	   been	  
contested	   within	   Political	   Philosophy	   and	   International	   Relations	   broadly,	   with	   a	  
number	   of	   serious	   problems	   emerging	   within	   the	   conventional	   approaches	   to	  
sovereignty.	   From	   this,	   frustration	   along	   with	   epistemological	   and	   ontological	  
challenges,	  a	  number	  of	  scholars	  such	  as	  Carl	  Schmitt,	  Michel	  Foucault,	  and	  Giorgio	  
Agamben	  have	  developed	  different	  theoretical	  approaches	  to	  the	  term.2	  	  
To	   understand	  Agamben’s	   approach	   to	   sovereignty	   and	   political	   organisation	   is	   to	  
acknowledge	   the	   influence	   of	   Schmitt,	   Foucault,	   Hannah	   Arendt	   and	   Walter	  
Benjamin,	  whose	  ideas	  underpin	  Homo	  Sacer,	  which	  introduces	  the	  idea	  of	  bare	  life.	  
In	  a	  broader	  sense,	  Agamben	  refers	  back	   to	  Aristotle,	  whose	  quest	   to	   identify	   ‘the	  
good	  life’	  maintains	  a	  central	  part	  of	  the	  initial	  stages	  of	  Homo	  Sacer.	  The	  influence	  
of	   Foucault	   and	  Scmitt	   in	  particular,	   is	   seen	   in	   ideas	  of	   the	   state	  of	   exception	  and	  
biopolitics,	  two	  concepts	  that	  seek	  to	  conceptualise	  political	  organisation	  and	  more	  
broadly,	   how	   to	   live.	   The	   idea	   of	   biopolitics	   is	   the	   establishment	   of	   political	  
structures	   that	   create	   power	   over	   life,	   or	   put	   another	   way,	   to	   ensure	   that	   life	   is	  
controlled	  by	  state	  power.	  As	  Foucault	  states	  
biological existence was reflected in political existence [...] For millennia, man 
remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with an additional capacity for a 
political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a 
living being in question.3 
From	  this,	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  state	  becomes	  evident	  and	  the	  structural	  factors	  that	  
regulate	  life	  become	  increasingly	  important	  and	  ultimately,	  the	  very	  concept	  of	  the	  
homo	  sacer	  is	  related	  back	  to	  the	  state	  and	  sovereign	  power.	  
Agamben	   begins	   his	   exploration	   of	   sovereignty	   –	   occurring	   across	   a	   number	   of	  
independent	   volumes	   –	  with	   a	   discussion	   of	   Schmidt’s	   state	   of	   exception	   and	   the	  
logic	   of	   sovereignty,	   albeit	   rife	   with	   contradictions.	   The	  most	   important	   of	   these,	  
indeed	   the	   paradox	   of	   sovereignty	   broadly,	   is	   the	   notion	   that	   the	   sovereign	   is	  
simultaneously	  situated	  within	  the	   law	  and	  beyond	  the	   law	  and	  thus,	  the	  power	  of	  
the	   sovereign	   is	  not	   found	   in	   the	  ability	   to	   create	  but	   the	  ability	   to	   suspend	   itself.	  
Such	  a	  move	  	  -­‐	  determining	  the	  state	  of	  exception	  –	  is	  explored	  in	  greater	  detail	   in	  
other	  works	  and	  whilst	   this	   is	   important,	   it	   is	   the	  ontological	   foundation	  of	  society	  
that	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  Homo	  Sacer.	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Such	  a	  starting	  point	  plays	  a	  prominent	  role	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  what	  Agamben	  calls	  
the	   condition	   of	   bare	   life,	   the	   link	   between	   violence	   and	   the	   law.4	   Stripped	   from	  
political	  significance	  and,	  as	  a	  consequence,	  at	  the	  mercy	  of	  extreme	  violence,	  bare	  
life	  is	  simultaneously	  the	  consequence	  of	  the	  state	  of	  exception	  and	  also	  the	  target	  
of	  sovereign	  violence.	  It	  is	  included	  in	  the	  exclusion	  and	  exposed	  to	  violence	  without	  
recourse.	  As	  Agamben	  argues,	  “the	  rule,	  suspending	  itself,	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  exception	  
and,	  maintaining	  itself	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  exception,	  first	  constitutes	  itself	  as	  a	  rule”5	  
(1995,	  p18).	  Biopolitical	   life,	  governed	  by	  the	  interaction	  of	   law	  with	  structural	  and	  
normative	  factors	   leads	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  bare	  life,	  as	  significance	  is	  stripped	  
from	  bios.	  
Agamben	  argues	  that	  	  
the	   realm	   of	   bare	   life	   –	  which	   is	   originally	   situated	   at	   the	  margins	   of	   the	   political	  
order	   –	   gradually	   begins	   to	   coincide	   with	   the	   political	   realm,	   and	   exclusion	   and	  
inclusion,	   outside	   and	   inside,	   bios	   and	   zoe,	   right	   and	   fact,	   enter	   into	   a	   zone	   of	  
irreducible	  indistinction.	  At	  once	  excluding	  bare	  life	  from	  and	  capturing	  it	  within	  the	  
political	  order,	  the	  state	  of	  exception	  actually	  constituted,	   in	   its	  very	  separateness,	  
the	  hidden	  foundation	  on	  which	  the	  entire	  political	  system	  rested.6	  	  
The	  distinction	  between	  bios	  and	  zoe	   is	  made	  by	  the	  state,	  differentiating	  between	  
an	   individual	   recognised	   as	   fully	   human	   through	   participation	   in	   political	   life	   and	  
those	  who	  are	  of	   a	   lesser	   category,	   of	   biological	   existence.	  Bios,	   then,	   is	   the	   good	  
life,	  the	  political	  life,	  evoking	  memories	  of	  Aristotle.	  It	  is	  worth	  stressing	  that	  bare	  life	  
is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  a	  biological	  zoe,	  rather,	  it	  is	  what	  remains	  of	  the	  destroyed	  bios.	  It	  
is	  the	  regulatory	  power	  of	  the	  state	  that	  leads	  to	  zoe,	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  exclusion	  
(inclusion)	  from	  the	  polis	  and,	  in	  this	  position,	  results	  in	  the	  exposure	  to	  violence	  and	  
violation	  without	   legal	   recourse.	  Ultimately,	   for	  Agamben,	  politics	   is	  driven	  by	   this	  
exclusion	  –	  and	  as	  a	  consequence,	  inclusion	  –	  of	  biological	  life,	  zoe	  from	  political	  life.	  
Agamben’s	  work	   on	   bare	   life	   occurs	   in	  Homo	   Sacer,	   named	   after	   the	   individual	   in	  
ancient	  Rome	  whose	  life	   is	  worthless,	  who	  is	  banned	  and	  may	  be	  killed	  by	  anyone,	  
just	   not	   for	   ritualistic	   purposes.7	   The	   power	   of	   life	   and	   death	   over	   people	   is	  
ultimately	   retained	   by	   the	   state	   and	   it	   is	   this	   position	   that	   has	   come	   to	   define	  
political	  life,	  with	  the	  camp	  as	  the	  exemplar.	  	  
As	  Agamben	  argues,	  the	  birth	  of	  the	  camp	  	  
is	  produced	  at	   the	  point	  at	  which	   the	  political	   system	  of	   the	  modern	  nation-­‐state,	  
which	   was	   founded	   on	   the	   functional	   nexus	   between	   a	   determinate	   localization	  
(land)	  and	  a	  determinate	  order	  (the	  State)	  and	  mediated	  by	  automatic	  rules	  for	  the	  
inscription	   of	   life	   (birth	   or	   the	   nation),	   enters	   into	   a	   lasting	   crisis,	   and	   the	   State	  
decides	  to	  assume	  directly	  the	  care	  of	  the	  nation’s	  biological	  life	  as	  one	  of	  its	  proper	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tasks...the	   camp	   is	   the	   new,	   hidden	   regulator	   of	   the	   inscription	   of	   life	   in	   the	  
order...[and]	   is	   the	  fourth,	   inseparable	  element	  that	  has	  now	  added	   itself	  –	  and	  so	  
broken	  –	  the	  old	  trinity	  composed	  of	  the	  state,	  the	  nation	  (birth),	  and	  land.8	  	  
Such	  a	  position	  stresses	  the	   importance	  of	  the	  state	  within	  the	  biopolitical	  project.	  
Supplementing	  this	  argument	  –	  and	  continuing	  the	  thought	  experiment	  –	  Agamben	  
suggests	  that	  the	  Hobbesian	  state	  of	  nature	  is	  indeed	  a	  state	  of	  perpetual	  bare	  life,	  
where	  everyone	   is	  “a	  homo	  sacer	   for	  everyone	  else”.9	  Moreover,	   that	   this	   state	  of	  
nature	  is	  a	  principle	  internal	  to	  the	  city,	  dwelling	  within	  the	  law	  of	  the	  city.	  As	  such,	  
sovereign	  power,	   the	   right	   to	   exercise	   violence	   and	   control	   over	   anyone,	   is	   at	   the	  
heart	  of	  the	  political	  project.	  	  
The	   contradictions	   inherent	   within	   sovereignty	   continue	   to	   shape	   political	   life,	   as	  
even	  those	  parts	  of	  society	  excluded	  from	  politics	  have	  also	  been	  included	  by	  their	  
very	  exclusion.	  This	  exclusion-­‐inclusion	  is	  the	  fundamental	  manifestation	  of	  modern	  
sovereign	   power.	  Moreover,	   sovereignty	   is	   underpinned	   by	   a	   zone	   of	   indistinction	  
between	   norm	   and	   exception,	   culminating	   in	   the	   state	   of	   exception	   and	   bare	   life.	  
Within	   this	   situation,	   as	   Patricia	   Owens	   notes,	   forms	   of	   resistance	   to	   sovereign	  
power	  are	  purely	  the	  enactment	  of	  bare	  life.10	  
Foucault’s	   notion	   that	   life	   is	   increasingly	   the	   focus	   of	   the	   state,	   the	   idea	   of	  
biopolitics,	   then	   this	   is	   built	   upon	   the	   ban,	   the	   original	   political	   relation.	   This	  
establishes	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  zone	  of	  indistinction,	  within	  which	  a	  ‘transgressor’	  is	  in	  the	  
zone	  between	  man	  and	  beast.	  Ultimately,	   it	   is	  the	  ban	  that	  holds	  together	  political	  
life,	   bare	   life	   and	   the	   homo	   sacer	   and	   sovereign	   power.	   It	   is	   the	   force	   “of	  
simultaneous	   attraction	   and	   repulsion	   that	   ties	   together	   the	   two	   poles	   of	   the	  
sovereign	  exception:	  bare	  life	  and	  power,	  homo	  saver	  and	  the	  sovereign”.11	  	  
Agamben’s	  approach	   teases	  out	  a	   range	  of	   factors	  useful	   to	  our	  enquiry,	   including	  
the	  nature	  of	  power	   relations,	   identity	   issues,	   inclusion	  and	  exclusion,	  yet	  perhaps	  
most	   importantly,	   the	   conditions	   that	   facilitate	   the	   emergence	   of	   violent	   groups.	  
There	  are,	  of	  course,	  a	  number	  of	  problems	  with	  this	  approach,	  notably	  its	  denial	  of	  
agency	  and	  the	  inability	  to	  explain	  change	  from	  within	  these	  conditions.	  Moreover,	  
Agamben’s	   approach	   is	   static,	   where	   individuals	   should	   accept	   their	   conditions	   as	  
“being	  thus”.	  Increasingly,	  individuals	  retain	  their	  agency	  by	  continuing	  to	  engage	  in	  
daily	   life	   encapsulated	   by	   the	   maxim	   resistance	   is	   existence,	   or	   by	   pushing	   back	  
against	  the	  expected	  norms	  of	  society.	  Moreover,	  some	  reject	  the	  principle	  of	  “being	  
thus”	   and	   find	   alternative	   ways	   of	   escaping	   their	   conditions.	   For	   many	   of	   the	  
Lebanese	   Shi’a,	   this	   meant	   becoming	   involved	   in	   groups	   such	   as	   Amal	   and	   later,	  
Hizballah.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Agamben,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  pp175-­‐6.	  
9	  Agamben,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p106	  
10	  Patricia	  Owens,	  ‘Reclaiming	  ‘Bare	  Life’?:	  Against	  Agamben	  on	  Refugees’,	  International	  
Relations	  23:4	  (2009)	  p573	  
11	  Agamben	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p109	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There	  are,	  of	  course,	  a	  number	  of	  problems	  with	  Agamben’s	  approach,	  which	  may	  
impact	   upon	   our	   project.	   That	   it	   is	   largely	   predicated	   upon	   a	   cannon	   of	  Western	  
philosophy	  yet	  applied	  to	  the	  Middle	  East	  is	  important	  yet	  falls	  into	  broader	  debates	  
about	   non-­‐Western	   International	   Relations	   Theory.	   It	   is	   also	   driven	   by	   structural	  
factors,	  largely	  leaving	  out	  the	  impact	  of	  agency	  from	  the	  analysis	  while	  also	  lacking	  
methodological	  development	  to	  explain	  change.	  Despite	  these	  problems,	  the	  idea	  of	  
bare	  life	  and	  the	  biopolitical	  project	  broadly	  is	  worthy	  of	  greater	  explanation.	  While	  
rigid	   in	   its	   legal	   approach,	   I	   use	   the	   concept	   of	   bare	   life	   in	   a	   broader	   sense	   than	  
Agamben	   initially	   conceived.	   Although	   potentially	   problematic,	   the	   informal	  
conditions	   of	   bare	   life	  within	   the	   logic	   of	   sovereignty	   that	   Agamben	   elucidates	   so	  
clearly	   is	   not	   as	   developed	   as	   he	   may	   require.	   These	   conditions	   are	   certainly	  
important	  in	  feeding	  into	  the	  marginalisation	  of	  people	  and	  ultimately,	  the	  creation	  
of	  bare	  life.	  	  	  	  
The	  Birth	  of	  the	  Party	  of	  God	  
Hizballah,	  the	  Party	  of	  God	  was	  formed	  in	  1982,	  predominantly	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  
the	   conditions	   facing	   Shi’a	  Muslims	   in	   Lebanon	   across	   the	   1970s	   and	   early	   1980s.	  
There	  is,	  unsurprisingly,	  a	  vast	  literature	  on	  the	  emergence	  of	  Hizballah,12	  which	  tells	  
a	  convincing	  story	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  Party	  of	  God,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  group	  
emerged	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   long-­‐standing	   socioeconomic	   grievances.13	   For	   the	  
purposes	  of	  our	  project,	  it	  is	  worth	  re-­‐telling	  this	  story.	  
After	   the	   1943	   National	   Pact,	   which	   acted	   as	   a	   declaration	   of	   independence,	   a	  
confessional	   political	   system	  was	   established	  wherein	  Maronites	   and	   Sunnis	   were	  
awarded	   the	   presidency	   and	   premiership	   respectively	   while	   the	   Shi’a	   community	  
was	  awarded	  the	  speaker	  of	  the	  house.14	  At	  this	  time,	  the	  Shi’a	  occupied	  only	  3.2%	  
of	  the	  highest	  posts	  in	  the	  civil	  service15	  and	  the	  influx	  of	  Palestinian	  refugees	  after	  
the	  1948	  war	  with	  Israel	  would	  impact	  on	  the	  labour	  market,	  increasing	  supply	  and	  
reducing	   expectations	   in	   wages.	   At	   a	   time	   of	   serious	   socioeconomic	   and	   political	  
change,	   Shi’a	   communities	   faced	   a	   number	   of	   challenges	   that	  would	   impact	   upon	  
their	  position	  within	  the	  Lebanese	  state.	  The	  nascent	  government	  in	  Beirut	  had	  still	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  See	  in	  particular:	  Augustus	  Richard	  Norton,	  Hezbollah:	  A	  Short	  History	  (Princeton:	  
Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  Ahmad	  Nizar	  Hamzeh,	  In	  the	  Path	  of	  Hizbullah	  (New	  York:	  
Syracuse	  University	  Press,	  2004),	  Nicolas	  Blanford,	  Warriors	  of	  God:	  Inside	  Hezbollah’s	  
Thirty-­‐Year	  Struggle	  against	  Israel	  (New	  York:	  Random	  House,	  2011),	  James	  Worrall,	  Simon	  
Mabon,	  and	  Gordon	  Clubb,	  Hezbollah:	  From	  Islamic	  Resistance	  to	  Government	  (Santa	  
Barbara:	  Praeger,	  2015),	  Judith	  Palmer	  Harik,	  Hezbollah:	  The	  Changing	  Face	  of	  Terrorism	  
(London:	  I.B.	  Tauris,	  2005),	  Matthew	  Levitt,	  Hezbollah:	  The	  Global	  Footprint	  of	  Lebanon’s	  
Party	  of	  God	  (London:	  Hurst,	  2013)	  amongst	  others.	  
13	  This	  is	  supplemented	  by	  other	  literatures	  that	  look	  at	  the	  rise	  of	  terrorist	  groups,	  the	  
emergence	  of	  violence,	  extremism	  and	  the	  debates	  around	  this.	  Engaging	  with	  such	  debates	  
about	  the	  motivating	  factors	  of	  such	  other	  approaches	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  piece;	  
rather,	  it	  seeks	  to	  offer	  a	  different	  approach,	  driven	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  escape	  bare	  life.	  
14	  Norton,	  Op.	  Cit.	  	  
15	  Hamzeh,	  Op.	  Cit.	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to	  figure	  out	  the	  most	  positive	  way	  of	  allocating	  resources	  and	  welfare	  to	  those	  who	  
needed	  it	  most,	  often,	  the	  Shi’a.16	  
The	   weakness	   of	   centralised	   government	   and	   the	   sectarian	   nature	   of	   politics	  
resulted	   in	   each	   sect	   establishing	   its	   own	   institutions	   and	   welfare	   system.	   In	   the	  
1960s,	   Lebanon	   enjoyed	   a	   booming	   economy,	   yet	   since	   independence,	   the	   Shi’a	  
were	  the	  most	  disadvantaged	  confessional	  group	  in	  the	  country.	  Augustus	  R.	  Norton	  
notes	   how	   in	   1974	   Shi’a	   Muslims	   comprised	   around	   30%	   of	   the	   population	   of	  
Lebanon	  yet	  received	  less	  than	  0.7%	  of	  the	  state	  budget.17	  Domestic	  conditions	  for	  
the	   Shi’a	   of	   Lebanon	   were	   increasingly	   precarious,	   facing	   discrimination	   and	  
marginalisation	   from	   a	   range	   of	   actors	   and	   struggling	   for	   their	   survival	   amidst	  
pressure	   from	   Sunni	   and	   Maronite	   communities,	   Palestinian	   refugees	   and	   Israeli	  
forces.	   Latent	   socioeconomic	   factors	   supplementing	   political	   structures,	   which,	  
when	  taken	  together,	  would	  result	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  bare	  life.	  
These	   latent	   factors	   are	   important,	   feeding	   into	   the	   structure	   and	   organisation	   of	  
society.	  At	  this	  time,	  GDP	  per	  capita	  was	  around	  2000	  Lebanese	  lira	  lower	  than	  other	  
confessional	  groups	  and	  although	  the	  Shi’a	  held	  19	  sets	  in	  parliament,	  if	  this	  was	  to	  
accurately	  reflect	  population	  demographics,	  Shi’a	  parties	  would	  have	  been	  entitled	  
to	   a	   further	   10.	   Moreover,	   the	   influx	   of	   Palestinian	   refugees	   would	   also	   have	   a	  
negative	  impact	  upon	  stability	  in	  Lebanon,	  resulting	  in	  the	  increased	  marginalization	  
of	  Shi’a	  communities	  “conceptually,	  politically	  and	  economically”.18	  	  
Such	   conditions	   –	   and	   indeed	   perceptions	   –	   have	   long	   afflicted	   the	   Shi’a	   of	   the	  
region.	  Writing	  in	  the	  19th	  century,	  David	  Urquhart,	  observed	  how	  	  
They	  are	  all	  in	  rags,	  except	  some	  of	  the	  Sheiks,	  and	  are	  all	  mendicants.	  […]	  The	  filth	  
is	   revolting.	   It	   would	   seem	   as	   if	   they	   took	   a	   particular	   pride	   in	   exhibiting	   their	  
rebellion	   against	   the	   law,	   originally	   proclaimed	   from	   Horeb	   and	   afterwards	   from	  
Mecca,	  both	  in	  regard	  to	  their	  persons	  and	  the	  cleanliness	  of	  their	  villages.19	  	  
Hasan	   Sharif’s	   description	   of	   the	   conditions	   that	   befell	   Shi’a	   areas	   provides	   useful	  
insight	  into	  the	  socioeconomic	  conditions	  shaping	  the	  south.	  
The	  south	  has	  the	  fewest	  paved	  roads	  per	  person	  or	  per	  acre.	  Running	  water	  is	  still	  
missing	  in	  all	  villages	  and	  towns	  although	  water	  pipes	  were	  extended	  to	  many	  areas	  
in	  the	  early	  sixties.	  Electricity	  networks	  were	  erected	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  but	  they	  are	  
inoperative	  most	  of	  the	  time.	  Sewage	  facilities	  are	  available	  only	  in	  large	  towns	  and	  
cities.	  Outside	  the	  larger	  centres	  telephone	  service	  is	  completely	  absent	  except	  for	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Albert	  Hourani,	  A	  History	  of	  the	  Arab	  Peoples	  (London:	  Faber	  &	  Faber,	  2005)	  p429.	  	  
17	  Augustus	  R.	  Norton,	  Amal	  and	  the	  Shi’a:	  Struggle	  for	  the	  Soul	  of	  Lebanon	  (Austin	  TX:	  
University	  of	  Texas	  Press,	  1987)	  p18	  
18	  Hassan	  Charif,	  ‘Regional	  Development	  and	  Integration’,	  in	  Deirdre	  Collings	  (ed)	  Peace	  for	  
Lebanon?	  (1993)	  pp151-­‐2.	  
19	  David	  Urqhart,	  quoted	  in:	  Augustus	  R.	  Norton,	  Amal	  and	  the	  Shi’a:	  Struggle	  for	  the	  Soul	  of	  
Lebanon	  (Austin	  TX:	  University	  of	  Texas	  Press,	  1987)	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single	  manual	   cabin	  which	   is	  usually	  out	  of	  order.	  Doctors	   visit	   the	  villages	  once	  a	  
week	  and	  sometimes	  only	  once	  a	  month.20	  
In	   addition,	   socioeconomic	   changes	   within	   the	   Lebanese	   economy	   would	   have	   a	  
detrimental	   and	   disproportionate	   impact	   upon	   the	   Shi’a.	   For	   instance,	   as	   the	  
Lebanese	   economy	   was	   shaped	   by	  modernity,	   the	   agrarian	   sector,	   long	   the	  most	  
common	   source	   of	   employment	   for	   the	   Shi’a,	   decreased	   as	   a	   share	   of	   total	  
workforce,	  from	  38%	  to	  11%.	  This	  dramatic	  shift	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  employment	  would	  
result	  in	  mass	  internal	  migration	  from	  the	  rural	  to	  the	  urban,	  where	  socioeconomic	  
conditions	  were	  equally	  harsh.21	  Migration	  to	  the	  cities	  would	  result	   in	  widespread	  
unemployment	   amongst	   Shi’a	   communities,	  many	  of	  whom	  were	  poorly	   educated	  
and	  lacking	  the	  financial	  reserves	  to	  survive.	  	  
From	   this,	   it	   is	   no	   surprise	   that	   the	   Shi’a	   largely	   remained	   beyond	   patron-­‐client	  
networks	  and	   the	  village	   remained	  as	   the	   locus	  of	  political	  dynamics.	  At	   this	   time,	  
local	   Shi’a	   leaders	   were	   unable	   to	   respond	   to	   changing	   security	   calculations,	  
marginalising	   those	   absent22	   and,	   as	   a	   consequence,	   the	   urban	   Shi’a	   were	   caught	  
within	   a	   double	   marginalization,	   from	   both	   city	   and	   village.	   This	   situation	   was	  
complicated	  by	  electoral	  law,	  which	  required	  voters	  to	  return	  to	  their	  villages,	  which	  
was,	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  1970s,	  an	  inaccurate	  portrait	  of	  Lebanese	  politics	  as	  only	  17%	  
of	   the	   population	   lived	   in	   rural	   areas.	   As	   such,	   even	   though	   new	   urban	   dwellers	  
sought	  to	  locate	  their	  political	  lives	  within	  the	  city,	  electoral	  laws	  meant	  that	  voters	  
remained	  bound	  to	  their	  villages.23	  
As	  noted	  previously,	  Shi’a	  experiences	  across	  Lebanon	  were	  multifarious,	  yet	  within	  
the	   Lebanese	   context,	   it	   became	   increasingly	   difficult	   to	   transcend	  one’s	   sectarian	  
identity,	   particularly	   amidst	   this	   socioeconomic	   change.	   Of	   course,	   the	   Israeli	  
invasion	   and	   the	   civil	   war	   that	   engulfed	   Lebanon	   would	   exacerbate	   these	   issues,	  
further	   exposing	   Shi’a	   groups	   to	   violence.	   As	   civil	   war	   broke	   out,	   Shi’a	  Muslims	   –	  
along	  with	  other	  factions	  within	  the	  conflict	  –	  were	  increasingly	  viewed	  as	  disposable	  
entities	  and	  while	  initially	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  Palestinian	  cause,	  concern	  at	  the	  loss	  
of	  autonomy	  across	  the	  south	  of	  Beirut	  led	  a	  number	  of	  Shi’a	  groups	  to	  turn	  against	  
the	   Palestinian	   cause.	   	   Increasing	   violence	   from	   the	   Palestinian	   Liberation	  
Organisation	   based	   in	   Lebanon	   against	   Israel	   would	   prompt	   the	   latter’s	   incursion	  
into	  the	  south,	  where	  a	  large	  percentage	  of	  the	  Lebanese	  Shi’a	  lived.	  	  
The	   secularist	   ‘rule	   by	   gun’	   approach	   of	   militant	   Palestinians	   would	   further	  
marginalise	  the	  under-­‐represented	  Shi’a.	  The	  incursion	  of	  Israeli	  forces	  into	  Southern	  
Lebanon	   would	   add	   to	   the	   precarious	   nature	   of	   life	   for	   the	   Shi’a,	   caught	   in	  
demographic	   struggles	   that	   were	   worsened	   by	   the	   presence	   of	   Israeli	   forces.	   	   As	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Hasan	  Sharif,	  ‘South	  Lebanon:	  Its	  History	  and	  Geopolitics’,	  in	  Elaine	  Hagopian	  and	  Sami	  
Farsoun,	  (eds)	  South	  Lebanon	  (Detroit:	  	  Association	  of	  Arab-­‐American	  University	  Graduates,	  
1978)	  pp10-­‐11	  
21	  Norton,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p22-­‐3	  
22	  Ibid,	  p28.	  
23	  Fuad	  I.	  Khuri,	  ‘The	  Social	  Dynamics	  of	  the	  1975-­‐1977	  War	  in	  Lebanon’,	  Armed	  Forces	  and	  
Society	  7	  (Spring	  1981)	  p392	  
	   8	  
former	  Israeli	  Prime	  Minister,	  Ehud	  Barak	  –	  who	  served	  in	  the	  Israeli	  special	  forces	  in	  
Lebanon	  -­‐	  stated,	  “when	  we	  entered	  Lebanon	  […]	  there	  was	  no	  Hezbollah.	  We	  were	  
accepted	   with	   perfumed	   rice	   and	   flowers	   by	   the	   Shi’a	   in	   the	   south.	   It	   was	   our	  
presence	   there	   that	   created	   Hezbollah”.24	  While	   Barak	   is	   perhaps	   overstating	   the	  
importance	  of	  the	  Israeli	  occupation,	  it	  certainly	  cannot	  be	  ignored.	  	  
Structural	   factors,	   including	   demographic,	   economic	   and	   discrimination,	   left	   large	  
parts	   of	   the	   Shi’a	   population	   marginalised	   within	   their	   own	   state.	   While	   legal	  
structures	   did	   not	   explicitly	   permit	   the	   killing	   of	   the	   Shi’a,	   the	   structural	  
discrimination	  and	  the	  civil	  war	  implicitly	  allowed	  the	  Shi’a	  to	  be	  killed	  with	  impunity	  
and,	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  war,	  large	  numbers	  of	  Shi’a	  were	  killed,	  forcing	  them	  to	  
turn	   elsewhere	   to	   ensure	   their	   security.	   While	   seemingly	   existing	   within	   the	  
conditions	  of	  bare	  life,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  a	  large	  number	  of	  Lebanese	  Shi’a	  did	  not	  accept	  
their	   condition	   as	   ‘being	   thus’;	   instead,	   they	   found	   traction	   in	   the	   belief	   that	  
Hizballah,	  the	  Party	  of	  God	  would	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  a	  way	  out	  of	  their	  conditions.	  A	  
way	   out	   of	   the	   marginalization	   and	   oppression	   that	   had	   characterised	   the	   Shi’a	  
experience	  and	  also	  a	  way	  out	  of	  the	  colonial	  legacy	  that	  had	  long-­‐defined	  the	  region	  
from	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  first	  World	  War.	  
Of	   course,	   grievances	   and	   structural	   violence	   alone	   are	   not	   enough	   to	   mobilise	  
people.	   As	   Gordon	   Clubb	   notes,	   in	   order	   for	   a	   group	   to	   succeed	   they	   need	   to	  
produce	   a	   frame	   that	   “draws	   upon	   historical	   grievances,	   culture	   and	   ideas	   and	  
provides	  a	  course	  of	  action”.25	  Clubb	   is	  correct,	  yet	   in	  the	  case	  of	  Hizballah,	  such	  a	  
frame	  also	  drew	  upon	  the	  legacy	  of	  Shi’a	  history	  and	  these	  narratives	  would	  provide	  
traction.	  Social	  networks	  –	  driven	  by	  clerics	  but	  also	  mobilised	  around	  work	  –	  across	  
the	  Shi’a	  would	  facilitate	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  Party	  of	  God.	  
Understanding	  Muqawamah	  
Conventional	   understandings	   of	   resistance	   suggest	   that	   it	   is	   in	   response	   to	   some	  
thing,	   a	   particular	   source	   of	   oppression,	   or	   counter-­‐power.	   Increasingly,	   given	   the	  
nature	   of	   power	   relations,	   by	   existing	   and	   by	   pushing	   the	   boundaries	   of	   accepted	  
behaviour,	   people	   can	   be	   engaged	   in	   a	   form	   of	   resistance,	   for	   which	   one	   must	  
consider	  the	  context	  within	  which	  agency	  is	  operating	  before	  considering	  the	  act	  of	  
resistance.	   Within	   the	   Middle	   East,	   this	   importance	   of	   context	   is	   increasingly	  
important,	  serving	  as	  a	  frame	  providing	  grievance,	  culture	  and	  ideas.	  Understandings	  
of	   resistance,	   known	   in	   Arabic	   as	  muqawamah,	   are	   shaped	   by	   local	   context	   and	  
Islam,	  emerging	  from	  the	  conditions	  of	  bare	  life.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Gilbert	  Achcar,	  The	  33-­‐Day	  War:	  Israel’s	  War	  on	  Hezbollah	  in	  Lebanon	  and	  Its	  Aftermath	  
(London:	  Saqi	  2007).	  	  
25	  Worrall,	  Mabon	  and	  Clubb,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p33.	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As	  Larbi	  Sadiki	  suggests,	  the	  concept	  of	  muqawamah	  is	  comprised	  of	  a	  broad	  range	  
of	  norms	  and	  values,	  agency	  driven	  and	  is	  shaped	  by	  a	  communal	  and	  Islamic	  ethos,	  
along	  with	  language	  and	  idioms.	  26	  Ultimately,	  it	  is	  	  
a	  way	  of	  thinking,	  being,	  and	  acting,	  and	  an	  ever-­‐widening	  site	  of	  holistic	  struggle	  in	  
which	   the	   AK-­‐47	   is	   not,	   in	   the	   scheme	   of	   resistance,	   more	   important	   than	   piety,	  
charity,	  schooling,	  propaganda	  or	  music.	  It	  simultaneously	  constitutes	  and	  embodies	  
a	  normative	   imaginary	   for	   enacting	  emancipation	  at	   various	   levels,	   beginning	  with	  
inner	   self-­‐transformation	   through	   resistance	   against	   religious,	   moral,	   and	  
intellectual	   laxity,	   and	   ending	   with	   creative	   protest	   of	   which,	   for	   the	   select	   few,	  
martial	  defence	  is	  one	  form	  of	  proactive	  engagement.27	  
Muqawamah’s	   literal	   translation	   is	  to	  stand	  up	  to,	  yet	   it	   is	   imbued	  with	  a	  range	  of	  
factors	  that	  can	  determine	  the	  intensity	  of	  a	  concept	  that	  is	  spatially	  and	  temporally	  
constructed.	  These	  factors	  are	  found	  within	  a	  particular	  time	  and	  a	  particular	  place,	  
yet	   they	  are	  malleable	  and	  part	  of	  a	  much	  bigger	  anti-­‐colonial,	   anti-­‐oppressor	  and	  
ultimately	   emancipatory	   project.	   It	   is	   clear	   that	   social	   and	   Islamic	   context	   has	   an	  
important	  role	  to	  play	  within	  the	  construction	  of	  muqawamah	  amongst	  a	  particularl	  
group	   and	   this	   concept	   has	   the	   capacity	   to	   draw	   people	   together,	   much	   like	   Ibn	  
Khaldun’s	   concept	   of	   asabiyya	   yet	   grounded	   in	   a	   shared	   religious	  morality	   rather	  
than	   tribal	   kinship.28	   It	   becomes	   increasingly	   apparent	   that	   the	   importance	   of	  
normative	   context	   stresses	   the	   local	   resonance	   of	   muqawamah	   and	   as	   Sadiki	  
suggests,	   this	   involves	   a	   different	   form	  of	   political	   grammar	   to	   the	   global	   jihad	  as	  
espoused	  by	  the	  likes	  of	  Sayid	  Qutb.	  
Muqawamah	  is	  increasingly	  seen	  in	  holistic	  terms	  and	  through	  the	  perception	  that	  it	  
should	  be	  all	  encompassing,	  transcends	  counter-­‐power	  and	  moves	  into	  the	  political	  
realm.	  Resistance	  may	  also	  involve	  a	  range	  of	  other	  factors,	  namely	  the	  occupation	  
of	   particular	   spaces	   and	   the	   rejection	   of	   displays	   of	   power	   within	   public	   space.29	  
When	  put	  into	  the	  context	  of	  rapid	  change,	  which	  can	  dislocate	  social	  relations,	  the	  
intermittent	   emergence	   of	   violent	   protests	   is	   hardly	   surprising.30	   Moreover,	   the	  
sectarian	   imbalance	   adds	   ‘sharpness’31	   to	   internal	   conflict	   and	   resistance	   efforts,	  
which	  are	  particularly	  visible	  within	  Hizballah’s	  actions.	  	  
From	   this,	   Hassan	   Nasrallah,	   Secretary	   General	   of	   Hizballah,	   suggested	   that	  
resistance	  is	  	  ‘not	  only	  a	  hand	  that	  bears	  the	  rifle	  and	  a	  finger	  that	  pulls	  the	  trigger.	  
Resistance	  is	  a	  complete	  organism	  with	  a	  thinking	  brain,	  eyes,	  veins,	  ears	  that	  listen,	  
a	  tongue	  that	  utters,	  and	  a	  heart	  filled	  with	  affection	  or	  full	  of	  anger.32	  The	  Deputy	  
Secretary-­‐General	   of	   Hizballah,	   Shaykh	   Na’im	   Qasim	   stressed	   its	   all-­‐encompassing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Larbi	  Sadiki,	  ‘Reframing	  resistance	  and	  democracy:	  narratives	  from	  Hamas	  and	  Hizbullah’,	  
Deomcratization	  17:2	  (2010)	  p356.	  
27	  Ibid.,	  p358.	  
28	  Khaldun,	  Op.	  Cit.	  
29	  Charles	  Tripp,	  The	  Power	  and	  the	  People	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2013).	  
30	  Ibid.,	  pp135-­‐6.	  
31	  Ibid.,	  p107	  
32	  Sayyid	  Hassan	  Nasrallah,.	  ‘Keynote	  Speech.	  Ramadan	  ‘Iftar’	  Ceremony	  held	  by	  the	  Society	  
for	  the	  Support	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Resistance,	  22	  November	  2001.	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character,	   “it	   is	   military,	   cultural,	   political	   and	   informational	   resistance.	   It	   is	  
resistance	  by	  the	  people	  as	  well	  as	  by	  the	  mujahidin;	  it	  is	  resistance	  by	  the	  ruler	  and	  
by	  the	  ummah”.33	  It	  becomes	  clear	  that	  muqawamah	  is	  not	  an	  immediate	  knee	  jerk	  
reaction	  to	  something;	  it	  is	  not	  solely	  a	  ‘counter-­‐force’	  as	  many	  may	  initially	  assume	  
and	  contains	  much	  more	  than	  a	  desire	  to	  respond.	  Resistance	  is	  typically	  held	  to	  be	  
in	   response	   to	   a	   form	   of	   hegemonic	   power	   yet	   the	   “all	   encompassing”	   aspects	   of	  
muqawamah	   seem	   to	   support	   a	  more	   holistic	   form	  of	   action,	   lending	   itself	   to	   the	  
idea	   that	   Hizballah’s	   actions	   have	   been	   referred	   to	   as	   a	   state	   within	   a	   state	  
(appropriate	   given	   the	   role	   of	   contradiction	   and	   indistinction	   within	   Agamben’s	  
work).	   The	   holistic	   approach	   to	   resistance	   also	   involves	   a	   restructuring	   of	   political	  
organisation,	  leading	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  social	  and	  security	  infrastructure.	  
Such	   ideas	  resonate	  amongst	   large	  parts	  of	   the	  Lebanese	  Shi’a	  population,	  but	   the	  
idea	  of	  muqawamah	  also	  transcends	  state	  borders.	  Nasrallah	  sought	  to	  demonstrate	  
that	  Hizballah	  has	  a	  globalized	  responsibility	  to	  lead	  the	  resistance	  cause:	  ‘We	  carry	  a	  
responsibility	   towards	   them;	  we	  bear	   this	   responsibility	   towards	   their	   liberation	   in	  
reciprocity	   to	   their	   wish	   for	   us	   to	   be	   free,	   and	   towards	   their	   dignity	   just	   as	   they	  
wanted	   ours	   to	   be	   intact	   [...]	   This	   in	   earnest	   is	   part	   and	   parcel	   of	   the	   ethos	   of	  
resistance	  –	  thaqafat	  al-­‐muqawamah.’34	  
The	  ability	  of	  muqawamah	  to	  interact	  with	  the	  local	  dynamics	  widens	  its	  resonance	  
across	   the	   region,	   particularly	   amidst	   the	   fragmentation	   of	   state	   sovereignty.	   As	  
Sadiki	   suggests,	   the	   fragmenting	   sovereignty,	   provides	   scope	   for	   resistance	   and	  
solace	   in	   the	  concept,	   for	  “in	   the	  absence	  of	  a	  homeland	   they	  are	  a	  homeland,	  an	  
imaginary	  that	  defies	  spatialization”.35	  Moreover,	  as	  people	  find	  themselves	  caught	  
between	   the	   institutions	   of	   the	   state,	   this	   also	   serves	   as	   a	   site	   of	   protest.36	   Ideas	  
travel	  across	  both	  time	  and	  space	  and	  the	  ability	  of	  such	  ideas	  to	  travel	  ensures	  their	  
survival	  and	  longevity.	  	  
Building	   upon	   this,	   as	   John	   Agnew	   notes,	   to	   think	   of	   sovereignty	   within	   a	   fixed	  
territorial	  space	  is	   infelicitous.37	  Similarly,	  to	  locate	  broad	  concepts	  of	  muqawamah	  
within	   a	   fixed	   time	   and	   space	   is	   problematic	   as	   the	   notion	   of	   resistance	   is	   a	  
prominent	  part	  of	  a	  much	  bigger	  emancipatory	  project.	  This	  transcends	  the	  local	  and	  
moves	  to	  the	  global,	  despite	  the	  earlier	  impression	  that	  localized	  norms	  meant	  that	  
it	   differed	   from	   the	   struggle	   that	   Qutb	   suggests.	   Context	   provides	   the	   coherence	  
necessary	  to	  help	  people	  coalesce	  around	  the	  concept	  of	  muqawamah	  but	  ideas	  at	  
the	  heart	  of	  muqawamah	  mean	  that	  audiences	  beyond	  the	  local	  can	  also	  be	  reached	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Na‘im	  Qasim,	  ‘Kalimat	  Al-­‐Iftitah’	  [Key	  Note	  or	  Opening	  Speech].	  In	  Qiyam	  Al-­‐	  Muqawamah:	  
Khiyar	  Al-­‐Shahadah	  wa	  Al-­‐Hayat	  [The	  Values	  of	  Resistance:	  The	  Choice	  of	  Martyrdom	  and	  
Life],	  ed.	  Shafiq	  Jaradi,	  et	  al.,	  5–12.	  Beirut:	  Dar	  Al-­‐Hadi	  &	  Ma	  ‘had	  Al-­‐Ma	  ‘arif	  Al-­‐Hakimah,	  
2008.	  P6	  
34	  Sayyid	  Hassan	  Nasrallah,	  ‘First	  Radwan	  [Pleasing	  of	  God]	  Anniversary	  Speech’,	  17	  
July	  2009.	  
35	  Sadiki,	  Op.	  Cit.	  
36	  Tripp,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p117.	  
37	  John	  Agnew,	  ‘The	  Territorial	  Trap:	  The	  Geographical	  Assumptions	  of	  International	  
Relations	  Theory.	  Review	  of	  International	  Political	  Economy,	  1:1	  (1994),	  53-­‐80.	  
	   11	  
(intentionally	   and	   unintentionally).	   Yet	   to	   remove	   the	   local	   is	   also	   problematic,	   as	  
the	   conditions	   shaping	   agency	   also	   shape	   perceptions	   and	   interactions	   with	  
normative	  structures.	  	  
The	   notion	   of	   resistance	   as	   part	   of	   a	   bigger	   emancipatory	   project	   is	   seen	   in	   the	  
formative	  stages	  of	  the	  Islamic	  republic.	  As	  Hamid	  Dabashi	  suggests,	  
from	   the	   preparatory	   stages	   of	   the	   Iranian	   Constitutional	   Revolution	   forward,	  
Shi’ism	  has	  been	  cognitively	  fused	  into	  a	  worldly	  cosmopolitanism	  that	  is	  no	  longer	  
limited	  to	  any	  given	  country,	  clime,	  or	  culture.	  By	  breaking	  such	   false	  binaries	   into	  
which	   Islam	   is	   habitually	   trapped,	   we	   see	   through	   the	   struggles	   of	   millions	   of	  
Muslims	   across	   history	  who	  have	  opposed	   and	   are	  opposing	   the	  domestication	  of	  
their	  worldly	  cultures.38	  
Such	   efforts	   demonstrate	   the	   unity	   that	   can	   be	   found	   within	   muqawamah.	  
Additionally,	   as	  we	   shall	   see,	   the	   rhetoric	   used	   by	   Nasrallah	   seeks	   to	   speak	   to	   an	  
audience	  of	  all	  Muslims,	  transcending	  sectarian	  divisions	  and,	   in	  doing	  so,	  migrates	  
from	  the	  local	  to	  the	  global.	  Of	  course,	  with	  this	  migration,	  the	  narrative	  loses	  some	  
of	  the	  traction	  that	  it	  finds	  within	  the	  Shi’a-­‐Lebanese	  normative	  context.	  In	  accepting	  
the	   premise	   that	  muqawamah	  possesses	  more	   than	   just	   a	   call	   to	   resistance,	   then	  
conditions	  must	  exist	  that	  cultivate	  this	  responsibility.	  It	  is	  shaped	  by	  agency,	  which	  
embeds	  the	  normative	  imaginary	  to	  provide	  coherence	  and	  endurance	  within	  ideas	  
of	   muqawamah.	   To	   understand	   this	   concept	   of	   resistance	   it	   is	   important	   to	  
interrogate	   the	   role	   of	   agency	   while	   also	   considering	   the	   construction	   of	   the	  
normative	   environment	   that	   speaks	   to	   both	   local	   and	   global	   audiences	   and	  
transcending	   the	   sectarian	   divisions	   that	   have	   begun	   to	   engulf	   the	   region.	   Such	   a	  
position	  suggests	  that	   it	   is	   imperative	  to	  bring	  agency	  back	  into	  discussions	  of	  bare	  
life.	  	  
Conditions	  of	  Muqawamah:	  The	  Karbala	  Narrative	  
The	   idea	   of	   resistance	   resonates	   clearly	   at	   this	   point,	   although	   prima	   facia	  
considerations	  suggest	   that	   there	  must	  be	  something	  more	  to	  motivate	   individuals	  
to	  coalesce	  and	  escape	  their	  socio-­‐economic	  conditions.	  Although	  Agamben	  suggests	  
that	  bare	   life	  emerges	   from	   legal	   structures,	   in	   the	   Lebanese	   case	   it	   also	   emerges	  
from	   socioeconomic	   and	   normative	   structures	   impacting	   upon	   Shi’a	   communities.	  
This	   is	   also	   shaped	   by	   Shi’a	   history,	   which	   shares	   a	   sense	   of	   marginalisation	   and	  
persecution.	  While	   a	   sense	   of	   injustice	   can	  motivate	  many,	   a	   sense	   of	  moral	   duty	  
must	   be	   combined	   with	   the	   ideas	   of	   bare	   life	   previously	   outlined	   as	   a	   means	   of	  
mobilising	  individuals	  to	  reject	  the	  position	  of	  “being	  thus”	  and	  understanding	  Shi’a	  
history	  can	  provide	  context	  to	  do	  this.	  	  
While	  Agamben’s	  work	  is	  helpful	  when	  considering	  the	  structures	  that	  lead	  to	  bare	  
life,	   it	   fails	   to	   adequately	   engage	   in	   questions	   about	   how	   groups	   of	   people	   can	  
exercise	  their	  agency	  and	  escape	  bare	   life.	  Agamben	  argues	  for	  the	  need	  to	  accept	  
conditions	   that	   people	   are	   in,	   being	   thus,	   yet	   in	   an	   increasing	   number	   of	   cases,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Hamid	  Dabashi,	  Shi’ism	  (Cambridge,	  Mass:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2011),	  pp283-­‐4.	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individuals	  forced	  into	  bare	  life	  reject	  their	  conditions	  and	  do	  not	  accept	  being	  thus.	  
One	   of	   the	   reasons	   for	   this	   rejection	   in	   our	   case	   stems	   from	   the	   emergence	   of	  
muqawamah	  yet	   the	  concept’s	  ability	   to	   resonate	  across	  a	  community	  means	   that	  
the	  structural	  conditions	  that	  create	  this	  resonance	  must	  be	  explored.	  	  
It	  quickly	  becomes	  apparent	  that	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  religious	  dimension	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  
the	  Party	  of	  God’s	  raison	  d’etre,	  driven	  by	  the	  narrative	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  Shi’a	  history.	  
This	  narrative	  has	  created	  a	  set	  of	  normative	  responsibilities	  that	  have	   imbued	  the	  
group	   with	   notions	   of	   resistance,	   whose	   enactment	   is	   a	   performative	   act	   of	   the	  
rejection	   of	   being	   thus.	   To	   understand	   the	   structural	   context,	   as	   Hamid	   Dabashi	  
suggests,	  we	  must	   locate	  the	  historical	  Shi’a	  experience	  within	  the	  broader	  Muslim	  
context.	  
At	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   Sunni-­‐Shi’a	   schism	   are	   questions	   of	   succession.	   The	   Shi’a	  
narrative	   holds	   that	   Ali,	   the	   son	   in	   law	   and	   cousin	   of	   the	   prophet,	   was	   the	   true	  
successor	   to	   Mohammad	   and	   was	   to	   be	   the	   first	   Imam,	   rather	   than	   the	   fourth.	  
Before	   Ali	   was	   given	   this	   position,	   the	   caliphate	   had	   accrued	   vast	   territories	   and	  
enormous	  wealth,	  bestowing	  great	  power	  on	  prominent	  figures,	  including	  many	  who	  
had	  opposed	  the	  prophet	  in	  Mecca.	  Despite	  this,	  the	  Shi’a	  narrative	  suggests	  that	  Ali	  
lived	  a	  pious	  life	  of	  austerity	  and	  prayer,	  becoming	  a	  focal	  point	  for	  dissent	  but	  also,	  
becoming	  resented	  by	  others	  in	  the	  caliphate.39	  As	  a	  consequence,	  tensions	  began	  to	  
emerge	   between	   the	   austere	   and	   those	   with	   wealth,	   a	   tension	   that	   would	   have	  
serious	   repercussions	   notably	   the	   murder	   of	   Ali	   and	   Hossein,	   and	   an	   increase	   in	  
tensions	  between	  Sunni	  and	  Shia.	  
These	  tensions	  within	  society	  are	  important	  when	  considering	  the	  work	  of	  Ruhollah	  
Khomeini,	   the	  first	  Supreme	  Leader	  of	   Iran.	  For	  Khomeini,	   ideas	  of	  resistance	  were	  
shaped	   by	   both	   the	   Shi’a	   experience	   and	   the	   penetration	   of	   the	   state	   by	   external	  
powers.40	   Such	   experiences	   shaped	   Khomeini’s	   understanding	   of	   prominent	  
concepts	  within	  Shi’a	   Islam.	  For	  example,	  Khomeini	  stressed	  how	  Shi’a	   Islam	  had	  a	  
history	  of	  rebellion	  embedded	  within	  it:	  	  
The	   Shi’i	   School	   of	   thought,	   which	   is	   the	   prevalent	   one	   in	   Iran,	   has	   had	   certain	  
distinguishing	   characteristics	   from	   the	   very	   beginning.	   While	   other	   schools	   have	  
preached	  submission	  to	  rulers,	  even	  if	  they	  are	  corrupt	  and	  oppressive,	  Shi’ism	  has	  
preached	  resistance	  against	  them	  and	  denounced	  them	  as	  illegitimate41	  	  
This	   understanding	   would	   also	   shape	   perceptions	   of	   society	   and	   political	  
organisation,	  which,	  for	  Khomeini,	  was	  
sharply	   divided	   into	   two	   warring	   classes—tabaqat:	   the	  mostazafin—oppressed—
against	   the	   mostakberin—oppressors;	   the	   foqara—poor—against	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Michael	  Axworthy,	  Iran,	  Empire	  of	  the	  Mind	  (London:	  Penguin,	  2008)	  p126.	  
40	  L.A.	  Reda,	  ‘Khatt-­‐e	  Imam:	  The	  Followers	  of	  Khomeini’s	  Line’,	  Arshid	  Abid-­‐Moghaddam,	  A	  
Critical	  Introduction	  to	  Khomeini	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2014)	  p116	  
41	  Ruhollah	  Khomeini,	  “Interview	  with	  Hamid	  Algar,”	  in	  Hamid	  Algar	  (ed.,	  trans.),	  Islam	  and	  
Revolution:	  Imam	  Khomeini,	  Writings	  and	  Declarations	  (London:	  Mizan	  Press,	  1981),	  p.	  327.	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sarvatmandan—rich;	   the	   mellat-­‐e	   mostazaf—oppressed	   nation—against	   the	  
hokumat-­‐e	   shaytan—Satan’s	   government	  …	  In	   the	   1970s,	   however,	   he	   used	   [the	  
term	  mostazafin]	   in	   almost	   every	   single	   speech	   and	   proclamation	   to	   depict	   the	  
angry	   poor,	   the	   “exploited	   people,”	   and	   the	   “downtrodden	   masses.”	   After	   the	  
revolution,	  he	  gradually	  broadened	  the	  term	  to	  bring	  in	  the	  propertied	  middle	  class,	  
which	  actively	  supported	  the	  new	  order.42	  
The	   idea	  of	  mostazafin	  would	  become	  a	  driving	   force	   in	  understanding	   the	   Islamic	  
Republic’s	   Foreign	   policy,	   becoming	   enshrined	   in	   Article	   3.16	   of	   the	   Constitution,	  
which	  provided	  support	  to	  the	  Shia	  groups	  across	  the	  world.	  Supporting	  the	  use	  of	  
such	   terminology	   across	   the	   Shi’a	   umma	   were	   a	   number	   of	   parallels	   made	   with	  
prominent	  events	  in	  Shi’a	  history,	  the	  most	  important	  of	  which	  was	  the	  Narrative	  of	  
Karbala.	  
The	   Karbala	   Narrative	   tells	   the	   story	   of	   the	   martyrdom	   of	   Hussain	   bin	   Ali	   by	   the	  
Umayyad	  army	  at	  Karbala	   in	  680.	  As	  Rola	  El-­‐Husseini	   argues,	   this	  narrative	   can	  be	  
found	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   Shia	   thought,	   evoking	   ideas	   of	   “martyrdom,	   sacrifice,	  
commitment	  to	  a	  cause	  and	  passion.”43	  Although	  Hussain	  was	  the	  grandson	  of	   the	  
prophet,	  he	  gained	  legitimacy	  by	  challenging	  the	  corruption	  and	  impropriety	  of	  the	  
Yazid	  court,	  rebelling	  against	  it	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  ‘purify’	  Islam.	  This	  rebellion	  ultimately	  
led	   to	   his	   death,	   along	   with	   his	   infant	   son	   and	   his	   supporters.	   Many	   hold	   that	  
Hussain	   sought	  martyrdom	   at	   Karbala,	   believing	   that	   the	   only	  way	   he	   could	   bring	  
about	   a	   return	   to	   a	   more	   pious	   form	   of	   Islam	   was	   by	   sacrificing	   himself.	   When	  
combined	  with	   the	   failure	   of	   his	   supporters	   in	   Kufa	   to	   aid	   him,	   ideas	   of	   guilt	   and	  
martyrdom	   become	   defining	   factors	   of	   Shi’a	   thought.	   Moreover,	   the	   allegory	   of	  
Karbala	  would	   demonstrate	   how	   ideas	   of	   rebellion	   took	   on	   increasing	   importance	  
within	  Shi’a	  narratives.	  	  
Hussain’s	  death	  is	  central	  to	  Shi’a	  thought,	  commemorated	  in	  the	  festival	  of	  Ashura,	  
on	  the	  10th	  day	  of	  Muharram.	  The	  Ashura	  festival	  celebrates	  the	   idea	  of	  resistance	  
while	   commemorating	   ideas	  of	  martyrdom	  and	  guilt	   and	  during	   the	   festival,	  many	  
Shi’a	   typically	  engage	   in	   forms	  of	  self-­‐flagellation,	  notably	  tatbir,	  the	  cutting	  of	   the	  
skin	  on	  the	  top	  of	  the	  head	  with	  a	  sword.	  They	  would	  also	  participate	   in	  mourning	  
rituals,	  also	  including	  self-­‐flagellation,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  “gain	  salvation	  in	  the	  afterlife	  
as	  well	  as	  in	  this	  lifetime.”44	  Despite	  its	  prominence,	  in	  the	  1990s,	  this	  practice	  was	  
banned	  by	  both	  Hizballah	  and	  Khomeini,	  who	  argued	  that	  Ashura	  should	  be	  marked	  
by	  revolutionary	  action45	  and	  stressing	  the	  importance	  of	  resistance.	  	  
As	   it	   began	   to	   play	   a	   prominent	   role	   within	   Shi’a	   thought,	   the	   Karbala	   Narrative	  
increasingly	   became	  an	   allegory	   for	   resistance	   and,	   from	   this,	  was	   extrapolated	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Ervand	  Abrahamian,	  Khomeinism,	  Essays	  on	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  (Berkley:	  University	  of	  
California	  Press,	  1993),	  26–7.	  
43	  Rola	  El-­‐Husseini,	  “Hezbollah	  and	  the	  Axis	  of	  Refusal:	  Hamas,	  Iran	  and	  Syria,”	  Third	  World	  
Quarterly	  31,	  no.	  5	  (2010):805.	  
44	  Edith	  Szanto,	  “Beyond	  the	  Karbala	  Paradigm:	  Rethinking	  Revolution	  and	  Redemption	  in	  
Twelver	  Shi’a	  Mourning	  Rituals,”	  Journal	  of	  Shi’a	  Islamic	  Studies	  6,	  no.1	  (2013):	  78.	  
45	  Ibid.	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allow	   for	   parallels	   to	   be	   drawn	   between	   Hussain	   and	   the	   mostazafin,	   and	   the	  
Umayyads	  and	  the	  mostakbarin.	  Prior	  to	  the	  revolution	  in	  Iran,	  similar	  parallels	  were	  
made,	   through	   the	  use	  of	   slogans	   such	  as	   “every	  day	   is	  Ashura	  and	  everywhere	   is	  
Karbala,”	   stressing	   the	   importance	   of	   resistance	   and	   the	   prominence	   of	   Karbala	  
within	  these	  understandings	  of	  resistance.	  
Extrapolating	  from	  the	  allegory	  of	  Karbala	  can	  also	  locate	  the	  narrative	  in	  the	  global.	  
Since	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Party	  of	  God	  in	  1982,	  Hizballah	  was	  seen	  to	  be	  supporting	  
the	  mostazafin	  –	  helping	  others	  to	  reject	  conditions	  of	  being	  thus	  –	  while	  Israel,	  the	  
United	   States,	   and	   Iraq	  were	   seen	   to	   be	   the	  mostakberin	   and	   thus	   parallels	  were	  
drawn	   with	   the	   Yazid.46	   Once	   this	   parallel	   was	  made,	   for	   Hizballah	   and	   also	   Iran,	  
resistance	   against	   the	   oppressor	   was	   a	   necessary	   condition	   and	   with	   it	   came	   a	  
rejection	  of	  the	  status	  quo	  and	  being	  thus.	  The	  allegory	  also	  lends	  itself	  to	  the	  anti-­‐
colonial	  and	  anti-­‐imperial	  aspects	  of	  resistance	  and	  as	  such,	  it	  becomes	  increasingly	  
apparent	  how	  muqawamah	  begins	  to	  find	  traction	  to	  move	  beyond	  the	  local	  to	  the	  
global,	  resulting	  in	  huge	  levels	  of	  popular	  support.	  	  
Such	   historical	   experiences	   feed	   into	   the	   structural	   and	   cultural	   factors	   shaping	  
conditions	   amongst	   the	   Shi’a	   of	   Lebanon.	   The	   biopolitical	   project	   at	   the	   heart	   of	  
Agamben’s	  work	  seeks	   to	   regulate	   life	  and	  within	   this	  Shi’a	  context,	   it	   is	  clear	   that	  
there	  are	  normative	  dimensions,	  not	   imposed	  by	   the	   state	  –	  yet	   regulatory	  all	   the	  
same	   –	   that	   have	   shaped	   existence	   and	   the	   performative	   politics	   that	   Tripp	  
discusses.	  The	  Shi’a	  narrative	  of	  sacrifice,	  persecution	  and	  marginalisation	  feeds	  into	  
construction	  of	  a	  collective	  identity.	  Within	  this,	  the	  death	  of	  Hussain,	  persecution	  of	  
the	  Shi’a	  and	   the	  marginalisation	  of	  Ashura	  all	   feeds	   into	   the	   idea	  of	  bare	   life,	  but	  
also	  feed	  into	  a	  sense	  of	  obligation	  within	  muqawamah.	  	  
The	   language	   of	   Karbala	   featured	   prominently	   during	   the	   burgeoning	   radical	   Shi’a	  
movements	  in	  Lebanon	  during	  the	  1970s.	  In	  particular,	  Imam	  Mousa	  who,	  sought	  to	  
evoke	  memories	  of	  Karbala	   in	  an	  attempt	   to	  galvanise	   the	  Shi’a	   community	   into	  a	  
stronger	  response	  to	  their	  situation.	  In	  the	  Shi’a	  heartland	  of	  the	  Bekaa	  Valley,	  Imam	  
Mousa	   gave	   a	   speech	   suggesting	   that	   there	   was	   “no	   alternative	   for	   us	   except	  
revolution	  and	  weapons,”	  and	  a	  month	   later	   in	  Baalbek,	  declared,	  “armaments	  are	  
the	  adornment	  of	  men.”47	  In	  the	  same	  speech	  to	  a	  crowd	  of	  75,000	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
Ashoura	   festival,	   Mousa	   channelled	   the	   legacy	   of	   Hossein	   and	   stressed	   the	  
importance	  of	  resistance:	  “Starting	  from	  today	  …	  we	  will	  no	  longer	  complain	  nor	  cry.	  
Our	   name	   is	   not	  Mitwali;	   our	   name	   is	   ‘men	  of	   refusal,’	   ‘men	   of	   vengeance,’	   ‘men	  
who	  revolt	  against	  tyranny’	  even	  though	  this	  costs	  us	  our	  blood	  and	  our	  lives.”48	  	  
These	   comments	   became	   a	   prominent	   part	   of	   a	   narrative	   of	   muqawamah,	   a	  
narrative	   that	   stressed	   an	   obligation	   and	   responsibility	   to	   challenge	   oppression,	  
based	   upon	   Shi’a	   history.	   Ultimately	   though,	   Mousa’s	   rhetoric	   resulted	   in	   the	  
establishment	   of	   Amal,	   not	   Hizballah.	   Despite	   this,	   it	   was	   a	   necessary	   step	   to	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  Kamran	  Scot	  Aghaie,	  The	  Martyrs	  of	  Karbala:	  Shi’i	  Symbols	  and	  Rituals	  in	  Modern	  Iran	  
(Seattle,	  WA:	  Washington	  University	  Press,	  2004),	  132.	  
47	  Blanford,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  21.	  
48	  Ibid.,	  p6.	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formation	   of	   the	   Party	   of	   God.	   Clearly,	   the	   charismatic	   use	   of	   the	   language	   of	  
resistance	  found	  resonance	  amongst	  the	  overlooked,	  occupied	  and	  marginalised	  of	  
Lebanon’s	  Shi’a	  community.	  	  
Karbala	  in	  Hizballah	  Manifestos	  	  
The	   prominence	   of	   the	   allegory	   of	   Karbala	   and	   its	   values	   are	   also	   found	   within	  
Hizballah’s	   two	  manifestos,	   the	  Open	   Letter	   of	   1985	   and	   the	   2009	  manifesto.	   The	  
language	   within	   both	   documents	   is	   evocative,	   espousing	   ideas	   of	   resistance	   and	  
unity.	  Despite	  being	  based	  in	  Lebanon	  and	  formed	  as	  a	  group	  to	  protect	  the	  Shi’a	  of	  
the	  state,	  the	  Party	  of	  God	  also	  sought	  to	  appeal	  to	  the	  wider	  umma:	  “We	  declare	  
openly	  and	   loudly	   that	  we	  are	  an	  umma	  which	   fears	  God	  only	  and	   is	  by	  no	  means	  
ready	   to	   tolerate	   injustice,	   aggression	   and	   humiliation.”49	   The	   argument	   is	   taken	  
further	   by	   Joseph	   Alagha,	   who	   suggests	   that	   Hizballah’s	   natural	   allies	   are	   “the	  
oppressed	  of	  the	  entire	  world,	  irrespective	  of	  their	  colour,	  race,	  or	  religion.”50	  In	  the	  
Open	  Letter,	  Hizballah’s	  responsibility	  to	  protect	  the	  umma	  is	  set	  out,	  by	  confronting	  
“basic	  enemies:	  the	  US,	  France	  and	  Israel	  …	  is	  against	  Westoxification,”	  although	  it	  is	  
pertinent	   to	   stress	   that	   the	   letter	   makes	   clear	   distinction	   within	   the	   idea	   of	  
Westoxification,	   as	   driven	   by	   a	   “hatred	   of	   the	   US	   administration,	   not	   the	   US	  
people.”51	  
For	   Hizballah,	   the	   Karbala	   Narrative	   is	   amended	   to	   become	   resistance	   against	   an	  
oppressor	  and	  an	  occupier,	  rather	  than	  the	  more	  traditional	  narrative	  of	  resistance	  
against	  a	  ruler	  and	  the	  symbolism	  of	  resistance	  still	  adorns	  the	  southern	  suburbs	  of	  
Beirut.	   In	   this	   narrative,	   the	   occupying	   force	   was	   Israeli,	   along	   with	   its	   ally,	   the	  
United	   States.	   Rola	   El-­‐Husseini	   locates	   this	   in	   the	   1985	   Open	   Letter,	   wherein	  
Hezbollah	  declared	  that	  its	  intention	  was	  to	  “expel	  the	  Americans	  …	  and	  their	  allies	  
definitely	  from	  Lebanon,	  putting	  an	  end	  to	  any	  colonialist	  entity	  on	  our	  land.”52	  	  
The	  notion	  of	  the	  mostazafin	  can	  also	  clearly	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  formative	  stages	  of	  the	  
group,	  notably	  in	  the	  1985	  manifesto,	  articulated	  in	  “An	  Open	  Letter:	  The	  Hezbollah	  
Programme.”53	  Under	  the	  banner	  of	  “Our	  Identity,”	  the	  document	  states:	  
We	  are	  often	  asked:	  Who	  are	  we,	   the	  Hizballah,	  and	  what	   is	  our	   identity?	  We	  are	  
the	   sons	   of	   the	   umma	   (Muslim	   community)—the	   party	   of	   God	   (Hizb	   Allah)	   the	  
vanguard	   of	   which	   was	   made	   victorious	   by	   God	   in	   Iran.	   There	   the	   vanguard	  
succeeded	  to	  lay	  down	  the	  bases	  of	  a	  Muslim	  state	  which	  plays	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  
world.	  We	  obey	  the	  orders	  of	  one	  leader,	  wise	  and	  just,	  that	  of	  our	  tutor	  and	  faqih	  
(jurist)	   who	   fulfills	   all	   the	   necessary	   conditions:	   Ruhollah	   Musawi	   Khomeini.	   God	  
save	  him!	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  An	  Open	  Letter:	  The	  Hizballah	  Programme,	  Available	  from:	  http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-­‐
organizations-­‐and-­‐networks/open-­‐letter-­‐hizballah-­‐program/p30967	  .	  
50	  Joseph	  Alagha,	  Hizbullah’s	  Documents:	  From	  the	  1985	  Open	  Letter	  to	  the	  2009	  Manifesto	  
(Amsterdam:	  Pallas	  Publications,	  2011),	  16.	  
51	  Ibid.,	  p20.	  
52	  El-­‐Husseini,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p805.	  
53	  An	  Open	  Letter,	  Op.	  Cit.	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The	  open	  letter	  continues:	  
We	  are	  an	  umma	   linked	   to	   the	  Muslims	  of	   the	  whole	  world	  by	   the	   solid	  doctrinal	  
and	  religious	  connection	  of	  Islam,	  whose	  message	  God	  wanted	  to	  be	  fulfilled	  by	  the	  
Seal	  of	  the	  Prophets	  …	  Our	  behavior	  is	  dictated	  to	  us	  by	  legal	  principles	  laid	  down	  by	  
the	   light	  of	  an	  overall	  political	  conception	  defined	  by	  the	   leading	   jurist	   (wilayat	  al-­‐
faqih).	  
The	   above	   passages	   demonstrate	   the	   admiration	   that	   Hizballah	   maintained	   for	  
Khomeini	   and	   his	   ideas,	   particularly	   concerning	   those	   of	   resistance.	   Of	   course,	   a	  
number	  of	  Lebanese	  clerics	  were	  trained	  in	  Qom	  under	  Khomeini	  who	  then	  played	  a	  
prominent	  role	  in	  facilitating	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  Party	  of	  God.	  
In	  response	  to	  the	  group’s	  evolution,	  in	  2009,	  a	  manifesto	  was	  written	  to	  reflect	  the	  
transition	  from	  an	  explicitly	  resistance	  orientated	  organisation,	  to	  one	  that	  engaged	  
in	   high	   (and	   indeed	   low	   –	   yet	   another	   nod	   to	   the	   simultaneous	   contradictions	   in	  
Agamben)	  politics	   in	   Lebanon.	  While	   less	  of	  an	   ideologically	  driven	  vision	   than	   the	  
Open	   Letter,	   Hizballah’s	   view	   of	   the	   world	   did	   not	   change	   dramatically	   and	   the	  
importance	  of	  the	  Karbala	  Narrative	  remains.	  The	  manifesto	  also	  seeks	  to	  draw	  upon	  
the	  experiences	  of	  the	  Shi’a	  of	  Lebanon,	  with	  resistance	  and	  oppression	  key	  themes	  
across	   it.	  The	  manifesto	  notes	   that	   its	   creation	   is	   “a	   result	  of	   the	  priority	  of	  deeds	  
and	  responsibility	  of	  sacrifice	  that	  we	  have	  experienced.”54	  
The	  third	  section	  of	  the	  manifesto	  discusses	  state-­‐society	  relations	  in	  Lebanon,	  with	  
an	   explicit	   focus	   upon	   the	   sectarian	   nature	   of	   Lebanese	   society	   and	   its	   political	  
system.55	   The	   manifesto	   argues	   that	   sectarian	   divisions	   cemented	   within	   the	  
consociational	   political	   system	   must	   be	   abrogated,	   in	   order	   to	   create	   a	   true	  
democracy,	  “where	  an	  elected	  majority	  can	  rule	  and	  an	  elected	  minority	  can	  oppose,	  
opening	   the	   door	   for	   a	   proper	   exchange	   of	   power	   between	   the	   loyalty	   and	   the	  
opposition”.56	  Yet	  these	  sectarian	  concerns	  are	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  domestic	  fabric	  of	  
the	  Lebanese	  state.	  The	  sixth	  section	  of	   the	  manifesto	  discusses	  notions	  of	   Islamic	  
resistance,	   again,	   with	   a	   focus	   upon	   the	   detrimental	   consequences	   of	   sectarian	  
divisions.	   The	   manifesto	   suggests	   that	   sectarian	   divisions	   should	   be	   a	   source	   of	  
“wealth	   and	   social	   vitality’	   but	   instead,	   are	   “exploited	   as	   factors	   of	   division	   and	  
incitement	  as	  well	  as	  a	  means	  of	  social	  destruction”.57	  While	  the	  section	  suggests	  the	  
Western	  and	  Israeli	  manipulation	  of	  these	  divisions,	  along	  with	  extolling	  the	  virtues	  
of	  Iran	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  resistance,	  it	  closes	  by	  stressing	  unity	  across	  the	  Muslim	  world,	  
in	  a	  passage	  worth	  quoting	  in	  full:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  The	  New	  Hezbollah	  Manifesto	  (2009),	  Available	  from:	  
http://www.lebanonrenaissance.org/assets/Uploads/15-­‐The-­‐New-­‐Hezbollah-­‐Manifesto-­‐
Nov09.pdf.	  	  




57	  Section	  6	  Islam	  and	  Resistance,	  The	  New	  Hezbollah	  Manifesto	  (November	  2009)	  Available	  
at:	  http://www.lebanonrenaissance.org/assets/Uploads/15-­‐The-­‐New-­‐Hezbollah-­‐Manifesto-­‐
Nov09.pdf	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The	   Islamic	  world	  gains	  strength	  with	  his	  allies	  and	  the	  cooperation	  of	  his	  countries.	  
We	   assure	   the	   importance	   of	   benefiting	   from	   the	   elements	   of	   the	   political,	  
humanitarian,	  and	  economic	  power	  available	  in	  each	  and	  every	  country	  of	  the	  Islamic	  
world,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   integration	  and	  non-­‐subjection	  to	  the	   invaders.	  We	  remind	  of	  
the	   importance	  of	  unity	  among	  Muslims,	  as	  Allah	  the	  Almighty	  said	   in	  his	  holy	  book:	  
“And	  hold	  fast,	  all	  together,	  by	  the	  rope	  which	  God	  (stretches	  out	  for	  you),	  and	  be	  not	  
divided	  among	  yourselves”	  (Sourat	  Al	  Imran-­‐verse	  103).	  	  
We	   also	   remind	   of	   the	   importance	   of	   cautiousness	   from	   sectarian	   sensitivities	   -­‐	  
especially	  between	  Sunnis	  and	  Shiites,	  as	  we	  wager	  on	  the	  conscience	  of	  the	  Muslims	  
in	  facing	  the	  conspiracies	  and	  schemes	  on	  this	  level.	  58	  
From	  this,	  we	  can	  clearly	   see	   the	  extent	   to	  which	  Hizballah	   figures	  have	  sought	   to	  
stress	  the	  global	  nature	  of	  their	  struggle	  and	  of	  muqawamah	  broadly.	  By	  framing	  this	  
struggle	   as	   one	   that	   includes	   all	   Muslims	   –	   transcending	   sectarian	   divisions	   –	  
Hizballah	  finds	  resonance	  in	  the	  holistic	  narrative.	  The	  prominence	  of	  Karbala	  within	  
Hizballah’s	   ideology	   only	   serves	   to	   support	   the	   Party	   of	   God’s	   concept	   of	  
muqawamah.	  	  
Evolution,	  Challenge	  and	  Fulfilling	  Obligations	  
Perhaps	   the	  most	   successful	   act	   of	   resistance	   across	  Hizballah’s	   existence	  was	   the	  
34-­‐day	   2006	  war,59	   which	   brought	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   Party	   of	   God’s	   alliances	   into	  
sharp	  focus.60	  While	  many	  saw	  Hizballah	  as	  a	  proxy	  of	  Iran	  and	  Syria,	  the	  launch	  of	  a	  
strike	   against	   Israel	   without	   Tehran’s	   approval	   highlighted	   the	   autonomy	   of	   the	  
group	   within	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘Axis	   of	   Resistance’.	   The	   anti-­‐hegemonic,	   ‘Axis	   of	  
Resistance’	  comprised	  of	  Iran,	  Syria	  and	  Hizballah,	  has	  endured	  across	  the	  duration	  
of	   Hizballa’s	   existence,	   with	   the	   two	   states	   providing	   ideological,	   technical	   and	  
financial	  support	  to	  the	  Party	  of	  God.	  In	  early	  1980s,	  Iran	  provided	  1500	  members	  of	  
the	  Revolutionary	  Guard	  Corps	  to	  help	  train	  the	  Party	  of	  God’s	  fighters	  in	  the	  Bekaa	  
Valley,	   while	   also	   supporting	   the	   group	   financially.61	   Syria	   served	   as	   a	   conduit	   for	  
weapons	  to	  be	  transferred	  between	  the	  two	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  ensured	  its	  importance	  
for	  both	  Hizballah	  and	  Iran.	  
A	   year	   earlier,	   the	   Cedar	   Revolution	   resulted	   in	   the	   end	   of	   Syrian	   dominantion	   of	  
Lebanon	   and	   the	   full	   withdrawal	   of	   Syrian	   forces	   from	   the	   state.	   The	   Syrian	  
withdrawal	   prompted	   Hizballah	   to	   join	   the	   Lebanese	   government	   as	   a	   means	   of	  
maintaining	   influence	  across	   the	   state	  yet	   the	   collapse	  of	   the	  unity	  government	   in	  
2011	  would	  once	  more	  open	   the	  door	   to	  external	   influence.	  As	  people	   celebrated	  
the	   New	   Year	   that	   January,	   ideas	   that	   would	   inflame	   the	   region	   had	   begun	   to	  
resonate	  across	  the	  Middle	  East.	  In	  the	  previous	  month,	  a	  Tunisian	  street	  vendor	  had	  
self-­‐immolated,	   seemingly	   out	   of	   a	   frustration	   at	   the	   socio-­‐economic	   conditions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  Ibid.	  
59	  Amos	  Harel	  and	  Avi	  Issacharoff,	  34	  Days	  Israel,	  Hezbollah,	  and	  the	  War	  in	  Lebanon	  (New	  
York:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2008).	  
60	  Rola	  El-­‐Husseini,	  ‘Hezbollah	  and	  the	  axis	  of	  refusal:	  Hamas,	  Iran	  and	  Syria’,	  Third	  World	  
Quarterly,	  Vol.	  31,	  No.	  5	  (2010),	  pp803–15.	  	  
61	  Worrall,	  Mabon	  and	  Clubb,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p123.	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across	  Tunisia.	  Few	  would	  be	  aware	  at	  this	  time	  that	  the	  act	  would	  be	  the	  catalyst	  
for	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  regimes	  from	  societies	  across	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  
The	  Arab	  Uprisings	  would	  pose	  a	  number	  of	  challenges	  for	  Hizballah,	  tearing	  up	  the	  
old	   order	   and	  with	   it,	   the	   alliances	   that	   had	   helped	   the	   Party	   of	   God	  maintain	   its	  
position	  of	  strength	  within	  Lebanon	  and	  across	  the	  region.	  Despite	  Lebanon	  largely	  
avoiding	  the	  uprisings,	  their	  onset	   in	  neighbouring	  Syria	  posed	  an	  existential	  threat	  
to	   Hizballah.	   In	   Syria,	   it	   was	   expected	   that	   the	   London-­‐trained	   former	  
Opthamologist,	   Bashar	  Al	  Assad,	  would	   take	  heed	  of	   the	  protestors’	   demands	  and	  
through	  reforms,	  reconcile	  the	  state.	  Instead,	  Assad	  and	  his	  forces	  sought	  to	  quickly	  
frame	   events	   along	   sectarian	   lines	   and	   began	   to	   repress	   the	   population.	   The	  
situation	   rapidly	  deteriorated	   to	   the	  point	   that	  at	   the	  5th	  anniversary	  of	   the	  Syrian	  
uprisings,	  around	  400,000	  had	  been	  killed	  and	  11	  million	  people	  had	  been	  displaced	  
from	  their	  homes.	  The	  UN	  referred	  to	  the	  Syrian	  civil	  war	  it	  the	  worst	  humanitarian	  
tragedy	  since	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  At	  first	  glance,	  Hizballah,	  in	  fighting	  against	  the	  
oppressors,	   should	   have	   supported	  opposition	   groups,	   however,	   the	  Assad	   regime	  
was	   a	   key	   ally	   of	   the	   Party	   of	   God	   and	   as	   a	   number	   of	   opposition	   groups	   were	  
vehemently	  anti-­‐Shi’a,	  geopolitical	  interests	  trumped	  the	  legacy	  of	  Karbala.	  	  	  
The	  declaration	  of	  a	  caliphate	  by	  members	  of	  a	  group	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Islamic	  State	  
of	  Iraq	  and	  al	  Sham	  (henceforth	  Da’ish),	  was	  declared	  on	  29th	  June	  2014,	  borne	  out	  
of	  the	  embers	  of	  Al	  Qa’ida	  in	  Iraq	  and	  the	  Islamic	  State	  of	  Iraq.	  A	  spokesperson	  for	  
the	  group	  articulated	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  caliphate	  as	  	  
a	  dream	  that	  lives	  in	  the	  depths	  of	  every	  Muslim	  believer	  […]	  It	  is	  a	  hope	  that	  flutters	  
in	  the	  heart	  of	  every	  mujahid,	  muwahhid	  […]	  It	  is	  the	  caliphate.	  It	  is	  the	  caliphate	  -­‐-­‐	  
the	   abandoned	   obligation	   of	   the	   era...We	   clarify	   to	   the	   Muslims	   that	   with	   this	  
declaration	  of	  the	  caliphate,	  it	  is	  incumbent	  upon	  all	  Muslims	  to	  pledge	  allegiance	  to	  
the	  caliph	  [Abu	  Bakr	  al-­‐Baghdadi].62	  	  
Da’ish	  gained	  prominence	  through	  using	  extreme	  violence	  as	  a	  strategy	  to	  provoke	  
fear	   in	   local	  and	  global	  audiences.	  One	  of	  the	  key	  features	  of	  Da’ish	   is	   its	  ability	  to	  
project	  a	  self-­‐defined	  role	  as	  the	  protectors	  of	  (Sunni)	   Islam.	   In	  a	  well-­‐documented	  
YouTube	  video,63	  filmed	  at	  the	  border	  between	  Syria	  and	  Iraq,	  a	  Da’ish	  spokesperson	  
articulated	  a	  desire	  to	  remove	  the	  boundaries	  imposed	  on	  the	  region	  by	  the	  Sykes-­‐
Picot	  agreement,	  yet	  failing	  to	  appreciate	  the	  nuance	  that	  this	  agreement	  was	  never	  
put	  into	  action.64	  Da’ish	  emerged	  from	  the	  Syrian	  desert	  in	  2014,	  capturing	  Mosul	  in	  
summer	   that	   year.	   The	   group	   was	   able	   to	   draw	   support	   from	   marginalised,	  
discriminated,	   fearful	   Sunnis,	   who	   sought	   refuge	   from	   the	   brutality	   of	   the	   Assad	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  Aaron	  Y.	  Zelin,	  Daesh	  Dead,	  Long	  Live	  the	  Islamic	  State,	  (Washington	  Institute	  for	  Near	  
East	  Policy,	  30.06.14)	  Available	  at:	  http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-­‐
analysis/view/Daesh-­‐is-­‐dead-­‐long-­‐live-­‐the-­‐islamic-­‐state	  	  
63	  ISIS	  –	  The	  End	  of	  Sykes-­‐Picot,	  29.06.14,	  Available	  at:	  	  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YyM0_sv5h88	  	  
64	  For	  a	  greater	  discussion	  of	  the	  Sykes-­‐Picot	  Agreement,	  see	  Barr,	  James,	  A	  Line	  in	  the	  Sand:	  
Britain,	  France	  and	  the	  Struggle	  that	  Shaped	  the	  Middle	  East	  (London:	  Simon	  &	  Schuster,	  
2011).	  Although,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  this	  narrative	  is	  problematic,	  resulting	  in	  the	  
rejection	  of	  political	  organisation	  and	  over	  stressing	  the	  role	  of	  religion.	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regime’s	   respone	   to	  opposition	  within	   the	  Arab	  Uprisings	   context.	   Such	   conditions	  
evoke	  memories	  of	  the	  conditions	  that	  brought	  about	  the	  rise	  of	  Hizballah	  30	  years	  
previously,	  although	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  serious	  points	  of	  departure.	  
The	   emergence	   of	   Da’ish	   provided	   an	   opportunity	   for	   the	   Party	   of	   God	   to	   both	  
secure	   the	   regime	  of	  Bashar	  Al	  Assad	   in	   Syria,	  whilst	   circumventing	   accusations	  of	  
using	  violence	  against	  the	  oppressed.	  With	  the	  Assad	  regime	  fighting	  against	  Da’ish	  
and	  Jabhat	  al	  Nusra,	  whose	  anti-­‐Shi’a	  messages	  were	  a	  cause	  of	  great	  consternation	  
to	  many	  Muslims,	   this	   provided	   greater	   justification	   for	  Hizballah’s	   involvement	   in	  
Syria.	   Of	   course,	   conditions	   across	   the	   state	   were	   increasingly	   precarious,	   with	  
individuals	   facing	   persecution	   from	   the	   regime	   and	   from	   militias	   operating	   with	  
implicit	   support	   from	   the	   state.	   In	   such	   conditions,	   much	   like	   in	   Lebanon	   in	   the	  
1980s,	  individuals	  turned	  to	  a	  more	  powerful	  organisation	  for	  protection.65	  
Since	   its	   inception,	   the	  Party	  of	  God	  has	  positioned	   itself	   strategically,	  primarily	  as	  
the	  protector	  of	  the	  Shi’a	  of	  the	  umma	  but	  also	  as	  a	  group	  acting	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  
downtrodden	  of	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  umma.	  As	  noted,	  the	  main	  aims	  of	  Hizballah	  are	  
found	   in	   the	  Open	   Letter	   of	   1982,	  which	   announced	   the	   group	   as	   a	   Shi’a	   political	  
actor	  that	  uses	  violence	  as	  a	  tactic.	  The	  Open	  Letter	  immediately	  posited	  Hizballah	  as	  
part	   of	   “an	   umma	   which	   fears	   God	   only	   and	   is	   by	   no	   means	   ready	   to	   tolerate	  
injustice,	  aggression	  and	  humiliation”,	  and	  each	  member	  is	  a	  fighter.66	  Although	  the	  
letter	   highlights	   the	   US	   and	   Israel	   as	   sources	   of	   enmity	   it	   notes	   how	   the	   group’s	  
friends	  are	  the	  world’s	  “oppressed	  peoples”.67	  	  The	  history	  of	  imperialism	  that	  left	  a	  
scar	  on	  the	  Lebanese	  psyche	  meant	  that	  the	  group	  was	  “more	  and	  more,	  in	  a	  state	  
of	   permanent	   alert	   in	   order	   to	   repel	   aggression	   and	   defend	   our	   religion,	   our	  
existence,	  our	  dignity”.68	  	  
For	  Hizballah,	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  Da’ish	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2014	  was	  three-­‐fold:	  first,	  
to	  the	  stability	  of	  Lebanon;	  second,	  to	  the	  Shi’a	  and	  holy	  sites	  of	  Iraq	  and	  Syria;	  third,	  
to	  the	  umma.	  By	  considering	  the	  interaction	  of	  these	  themes,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  see	  the	  
move	   from	   the	   local	   to	   the	   global,	   yet	   this	   also	   highlights	   the	   geopolitical	  
considerations	  in	  operation,	  ultimately	  resulting	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  bare	  life	  in	  Syria.	  
Within	  this	  rhetoric,	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  to	  see	  the	  securitization	  of	  Da’ish,	  where	  the	  
Party	   of	   God	   seeks	   to	   frame	   the	   group	   as	   an	   existential	   threat	   and	   to	   suspend	  
‘normal	  politics’.69	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  Simon	  Mabon	  and	  Stephen	  Royle,	  The	  Origins	  of	  ISIS:	  The	  Collapse	  of	  Nations	  and	  
Revolution	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  (London:	  I.B.	  Tauris,	  2016).	  





69	  Such	  a	  process	  differs	  from	  other	  securitization	  processes	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  First,	  
securitization	  is	  a	  Western	  concept	  that	  is	  largely	  lacking	  exploration	  in	  the	  non-­‐Western	  
world.	  Second,	  securitizing	  moves	  typically	  take	  place	  from	  a	  state	  actor	  and	  while	  Hizballah	  
occupies	  a	  unique	  position	  within	  the	  Lebanese	  state,	  this	  is	  different	  to	  how	  the	  theory	  was	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In	  post	  Cold	  War	  efforts	  to	  broaden	  the	  security	  agenda	  and	  engage	  with	  a	  rapidly	  
changing	  security	  environment,	  Barry	  Buzan	  and	  Ole	  Waever	  broadened	  discussions	  
of	  security	  to	  include	  processes	  of	  securitization,	  the	  framing	  of	  a	  particular	  group	  as	  
an	  existential	   threat	   to	  a	  different	  group	  of	  people.	  This	  strategy	  seeks	   to	  suspend	  
normal	  politics70	  and	  to	  facilitate	  a	  response	  to	  this	  particular	  threat.	  Such	  a	  process	  
typically	   occurs	   over	   three	   stages:	   the	   first	   is	   the	   designation	   of	   the	   threat,	   the	  
second	  are	  the	  facilitating	  conditions	  and	  the	  third	  is	  the	  audience.71	  From	  this,	  the	  
decision	  must	  be	  made	  that	  X	  poses	  an	  existential	  threat	  to	  a	  particular	  group	  while	  
the	   second	   is	   to	   locate	   that	  within	   the	   conditions	   that	   support	   such	   a	   framing.	   To	  
successfully	  frame	  such	  a	  threat	  in	  existential	  terms	  requires	  a	  solid	  grounding	  within	  
a	   context	   that	   would	   help	   the	   frame	   find	   traction.	   It	   is	   worth	   noting	   that	   the	  
audience	  does	  not	  have	  to	  accept	  the	  process	  of	  securitization	  for	  such	  a	  process	  to	  
have	  occurred.72	  While	  there	  are	  a	  range	  of	  problems	  with	  this	  process,	  sagaciously	  
unpacked	  elsewhere,73	  one	  can	  see	  the	  process	   in	  which	  Hizballah	  sought	  to	  frame	  
Da’ish	   as	   an	   existential	   threat	   in	   the	   summer	  of	   2014.	   Looking	   at	   this	   time	  period	  
allows	  us	  to	  consider	  the	  formative	  stages	  of	  such	  a	  narrative	  and	  perceptions	  of	  the	  
group.	  	  
Speaking	  to	  Lebanese	  newspapers,	  Nasrallah	  stressed	  the	  importance	  of	  Hizballah’s	  
actions	   in	   Syria,	   using	   the	   threat	   of	   Da’ish	   as	   a	   justification	   for	   intervention.	  
Following	  this	  claim,	  the	  argument	  runs	  thus:	  if	  the	  Party	  of	  God	  had	  not	  “intervened	  
in	  Syria	   the	   right	  way	  and	  at	   the	   right	   time,	  Da’ish	  would	  be	   in	  Beirut	  now”.74	  The	  
threat	  posed	  by	  Da’ish	   to	   the	   stability	  of	   Lebanon	   featured	  heavily	   in	   speeches	  by	  
prominent	   Hizballah	   figures	   at	   the	   time.	   Speaking	   at	   a	   ceremony	   to	   honour	   the	  
death	  of	  a	  Hizballah	  martyr,	  Shiekh	  Nabil	  Kaouk,	   the	  deputy	  head	  of	   the	  Executive	  
Council	   stated	   that	   the	   “terrorist	   threat	  on	   Lebanon	   is	   actual,	   real	   and	   continuous	  
[…]	   ISIS’s	   decision	   has	   been	   announced.	   Their	   pretended	   slogan	   is	   to	   create	   the	  
Islamic	   State	   in	   Iraq	   and	   Greater	   Syria,	   which	   includes	   Lebanon”.75	   The	   choice	   of	  
audience	  is	  clear,	  with	  the	  speech	  framing	  the	  threat	  as	  one	  to	  Lebanon,	  not	  just	  the	  
Shi’a.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
initially	  developed.	  As	  such,	  greater	  exploration	  into	  this	  area	  is	  paramount.	  For	  a	  greater	  
discussion	  of	  this	  see:	  Claire	  Wilkinson,	  ‘The	  Copenhagen	  School	  on	  Tour	  in	  Kyrgyzstan:	  Is	  
Securitization	  Theory	  Useable	  Outside	  Europe?’	  Security	  Dialogue	  38:1	  (2007)	  	  	  
70	  See:	  Barry	  Buzan,	  Ole	  Waever	  and	  Jaap	  de	  Wilde,	  Security:	  A	  New	  Framework	  for	  Analysis	  
(Boulder,	  CO:	  Lynne	  Rienner,	  1998)	  and	  Thierry	  Balzacq,	  ‘The	  Three	  Faces	  of	  Securitization:	  
Political	  Agency,	  Audience	  and	  Context’,	  European	  Journal	  of	  International	  Relations	  11:2	  
(2005),	  p171.	  	  
71	  See:	  Paul	  Roe,	  ‘Actor,	  Audience(s)	  and	  Emergency	  Measures:	  Securitization	  and	  the	  UK’s	  
Decision	  to	  Invade	  Iraq’,	  Security	  Dialogue	  39:6	  (2008)	  and	  Matt	  McDonald,	  ‘Securitization	  
and	  the	  Construction	  of	  Security’,	  European	  Journal	  of	  International	  Relations	  14:4	  (2008)	  
72	  Ibid.	  
73	  See,	  in	  particular,	  Wilkinson,	  Op.	  Cit.	  
74	  Nasrallah:	  ISIS	  would	  be	  in	  Beirut	  if	  not	  for	  Hezbollah	  intervention	  in	  Syria	  (Al	  Akhbar,	  
17.06.14)	  Available	  at:	  http://english.al-­‐akhbar.com/node/20207	  	  
75	  Hezbollah:	  ISIS	  wants	  Lebanon,	  (The	  Daily	  Star	  31.08.14)	  Available	  at:	  
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-­‐News/2014/Aug-­‐31/269106-­‐hezbollah-­‐Daesh-­‐
wants-­‐lebanon.ashx#axzz3CGYeUT5Y	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While	  many	  of	  the	  skirmishes	  on	  the	  Lebanese-­‐Syrian	  border	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2014	  
Jabat	   al-­‐Nusra	   fighters,76	   the	   expansionist	   aspirations	   of	   Da’ish	  would	   cause	   great	  
concern.	   The	   seizure	   of	   the	   Lebanese	   town	   of	   Arsal	   highlighted	   the	   intention	   and	  
capability	  of	   the	  group	  while	  also	  exacerbating	  Hizballah’s	   fears.	   The	  areas	  around	  
Arsal	  are	  predominantly	  Sunni	  and,	  given	  the	  poor	  economic	  conditions	  at	  this	  time,	  
were	   perceived	   to	   be	   ideal	   conditions	   for	   Da’ish	   to	   spread.	   Furthermore,	   gaining	  
access	   to	   Tripoli,	   the	  Mediterranean	   port,	   was	   seen	   as	   a	   primary	   goal,	   aiding	   the	  
smuggling	  of	  weapons	  and	  artefacts,	  which	  became	  an	  increasingly	  important	  source	  
of	   finance.	   In	   response	   to	   growing	   concerns	   about	   Da’ish	   expansionism,	   Hizballah	  
sped	   up	   the	   creation	   of	   its	   Lebanese	   Resistance	   Brigades,	   which	   sought	   to	   draw	  
members	   from	   communities	   other	   than	   the	   Shi’a.	   Such	   efforts	   emerge	   from	  
Hizballah’s	   global	  muqawamah	   project,	   creating	   a	   unified,	   trans-­‐sectarian	   form	   of	  
resistance.	  
Many	  in	  the	  Shi’a	  community	  were	  also	  concerned	  as	  to	  Da’ish’s	  intentions	  over	  sites	  
of	   Shi’a	   importance	   within	   Iraq,	   which	   far	   outweigh	   those	   in	   Syria.	   Given	   the	  
importance	  of	  Karbala	  and	  other	  prominent	  Shi’a	  sites	  in	  Iraq,	  it	  was	  proclaimed	  that	  
“Hezbollah	  is	  willing	  to	  sacrifice	  for	  Iraq	  five	  times	  as	  much	  as	  we	  sacrificed	  in	  Syria	  
for	  the	  significantly	  more	  important	  holy	  places.”77	  Following	  this	  statement,	  Da’ish	  
declared	  war	  on	  Hizballah.78	  While	  Hizballah	  was	  heralded	  as	  one	  of	   the	   strongest	  
military	  organisations	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  opening	  up	  another	  theatre	  of	  operations	  
would	   pose	   a	   serious	   challenge	   to	   the	   group’s	   capabilities,	   reducing	   its	   ability	   to	  
engage	  in	  other	  arenas.	  	  	  	  
At	   an	   event	   in	   Deir	   Al	   Zahrani,	   Mohammad	   Raad,	   the	   head	   of	   Hizballah’s	  
parliamentary	   bloc	   spoke	   of	   the	   need	   to	   confront	   Da’ish	   and	   their	   backers:	   “We	  
know	   how	   to	   confront	   your	   plan	   in	   its	   own	   home,	   and	   how	   to	   topple	   all	   your	  
delusions”.79	   It	   is	   clear	   that	   this	   language	   is	   part	   of	   a	   securitization	   project	   by	  
Nasrallah,	   seeking	   to	   frame	  Da’ish	   as	   an	   existential	   threat	   not	   only	   to	   the	   Shi’a	   of	  
Lebanon	  but	  to	  the	  umma	  and	  wider	  Middle	  East	  generally,	  while	  also	  stressing	  the	  
Party	  of	  God’s	  capabilities.	  	  
Despite	  Hizballah’s	  concerns	  as	  to	  the	  potential	  impact	  of	  Da’ish	  upon	  Shi’a	  Muslims,	  
the	   threat	   transcends	   the	   sectarian,	   once	   again	   stressing	   the	   global	   nature	   of	  
muqawamah.	   In	   a	   speech	  marking	   the	   eighth	   anniversary	   of	   the	   end	   of	   the	   2006	  
war,	  Nasrallah	  warned	  of	  the	  dangers	  of	  the	  group	  
We	  have	  to	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  a	  real	  existential	  danger	  threatening	  us	  all	  and	  it	  is	  
not	   a	   joke	   […]	   This	   danger	   does	   not	   recognise	   Shias,	   Sunnis,	   Muslims,	   Christians,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  Jabat	  al-­‐Nusra	  is	  a	  Syrian	  opposition	  group	  that	  possessed	  close	  ties	  with	  Al	  Qa’ida	  until	  
late	  July	  2016.	  While	  operating	  with	  facets	  of	  the	  Free	  Syrian	  Army,	  al-­‐Nusra	  is	  opposed	  to	  
collaborating	  with	  Da’ish	  and	  is	  now	  identified	  as	  Jabat	  Fatah	  al	  Sham.	  
77	  Paula	  Asith,	  Lebanon’s	  Hezbollah	  ready	  to	  fight	  ISIS	  in	  Iraq	  (Asharq	  Al-­‐Awsat,	  25.06.14)	  
Available	  at:	  http://www.aawsat.net/2014/06/article55333611	  	  
78	  Matthew	  Levitt,	  M.,	  As	  Various	  Actors	  Circle	  Iraq,	  ISIS	  Faces	  Foreign	  Foes,	  (Washington	  
Institute	  for	  Near	  East	  Policy,	  01.07.14)	  	  
79	  Asith,	  Op.	  Cit.	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Druze,	  Yazidis,	  Arabs	  or	  Kurds.	  This	  monster	  is	  growing	  and	  getting	  bigger.80	  
This	  warning	  continued	  to	  highlight	  the	  danger	  to	  all	  Muslims	  
I	   call	   on	   every	   Lebanese,	   Palestinian,	   Iraqi,	   Syrian	   and	   any	   Gulf	   national	   to	   leave	  
sectarian	  intolerance	  behind	  and	  think	  that	  this	  phenomenon	  is	  not	  a	  threat	  against	  
Shias	   only.	   No	   one	   should	   regard	   this	   battle	   as	   a	   sectarian	   one,	   it	   is	   a	   takfiri	   war	  
against	  anyone	  who	  opposed	  it.81	  
Such	  quotes	   highlight	   both	   the	   concern	   that	  many	   in	   the	   region	   shared	   about	   the	  
threat	   posed	   by	   Da’ish	   but	   also	   how	   Hizballah	   saw	   itself	   as	   the	   protector	   of	   the	  
Muslim	  world,	   standing	   against	   the	   oppressors	   and	   the	   takfiris.	   Both	   John	   Agnew	  
and	  Hamid	  Dabashi	   are	   correct,	   however,	   to	   stress	   the	  dangers	   of	   suggesting	   that	  
these	  pressures	  can	  be	  reduced	  to	  the	  experiences	  one	  state	  and	  the	  extrapolation	  
of	   such	   threats	   serves	   Hizballah’s	   cause.	   Of	   course,	   by	   fighting	   in	   Syria	   against	  
opposition	  groups,	  a	  number	  of	  whom	  were	  not	  Da’ish	  –	  and	  were	  indeed	  oppressed	  
themselves	  –	   the	  Party	  of	  God	   is	   fighting	  against	   its	  raison	  d’etre.	  Despite	   this,	   the	  
Party	   of	   God	  would	   hold	   public	   rallies	   condemning	  Da’ish	   attacks	   on	   Shi’a	   shrines	  
across	  the	  region	  and	  such	  acts	  once	  again	  demonstrate	  the	  performative	  aspect	  of	  
resistance.	  
Muqawamah	  and	  The	  Return	  of	  Bare	  Life	  
While	   the	   extent	   of	   Hizballah’s	   concerns	   about	   the	   threat	   posed	   by	   Dai’sh	   are	  
apparent,	  the	  emergence	  of	  Da’ish	  provided	  the	  Party	  of	  God	  with	  an	  opportunity	  to	  
improve	   its	   image.	   The	   erosion	   of	   the	   Party	   of	   God’s	   credibility	   following	   their	  
involvement	   in	   the	   Syrian	   conflict,	   fighting	   alongside	   Bashar	   al-­‐Assad,	   severely	  
damaged	   Hizballah’s	   standing	   within	   the	   region.	   Having	   developed	   a	   narrative	   of	  
resistance,	  building	  upon	  the	  work	  of	  Ruhollah	  Khomeini,	  Hizballah	  vocalised	  a	  desire	  
to	   protect	   the	   downtrodden	   of	   the	   Muslim	   world,	   which	   transcended	   sectarian	  
divisions	  and	  framed	  the	  Party	  of	  God	  as	  the	  protector	  of	  the	  umma.	  Support	  for	  the	  
Assad	   regime’s	   oppression	   of	   the	   Syrian	   people	  would	   challenge	   this	   position	   and	  
these	  concerns	  would	  be	  furthered	  by	  engagement	  in	  conflict	  in	  Syria.	  By	  supporting	  
the	   oppressor	   rather	   than	   the	   oppressed	   amidst	   serious	   societal	   dislocations,	  
Hizballah’s	   narrative	   of	   resistance	   and	  position	   as	   the	   protector	   of	   the	  umma	  was	  
eroded.	  	  
By	   vocally	   opposing	  Da’ish	   and	   using	   language	   that	   transcends	   sectarian	   divisions,	  
Hizballah	   sought	   to	   capitalise	   an	   opportunity	   to	   regain	   lost	   legitimacy.	   Nasrallah’s	  
‘monster’	   required	   a	   trans-­‐sectarian	   response,	   with	   the	   Party	   of	   God	   positioning	  
itself	   at	   the	   vanguard.	   Yet	   continued	   involvement	   in	   Syria	   against	   a	   range	   of	  
opposition	   groups,	  many	   of	  whom	   receive	   support	   from	   the	  wealthy	  Gulf	   states82	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  Nasrallah:	  ISIS	  is	  a	  “real	  existential	  danger”	  to	  the	  whole	  region,	  (Al	  Akhbar,	  15.08.14)	  
Available	  at:	  http://english.al-­‐akhbar.com/node/21153	  	  
81	  Ibid.	  
82	  See:	  Roula	  Khalaf	  and	  Abigail	  Fielding	  Smith,	  Qatar	  bankrolls	  Syrian	  revolt	  with	  cash	  and	  
arms	  (Financial	  Times,	  16.05.13)	  Available	  from:	  http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/86e3f28e-­‐
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would	   have	   regional	   consequences.	   The	   civilian	   consequences	   of	   this	   conflict	   are	  
catastrophic	   and	   Hizballah’s	   involvement	   undeniably	   helped	   Assad	   retain	  
sovereignty	   over	   Syria.	   While	   not	   necessarily	   directly	   involved	   in	   creating	   –	   or	  
regulating	  –	  conditions	  of	  bare	  life,	  Hizballah	  has	  been	  complicit	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  
such	   conditions.	   The	   use	   of	   barrel	   bombs	   killed	   civilians	   indiscriminately	   and	   the	  
strategic	  targeting	  of	  infrastructure	  essential	  to	  living	  life	  has	  only	  served	  to	  worsen	  
these	  conditions.	  During	   the	  civil	  war,	  Sunnis	   struggled	   to	  secure	   their	  basic	  needs	  
and	   to	   protect	   themselves	   and	   their	   families.	   The	   destruction	   of	   hospitals	   and	  
schools	  makes	  the	  situation	  increasingly	  precarious.83	  	  
Parallels	  can	  easily	  be	  drawn	  between	  conditions	  in	  Lebanon	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  post	  
uprisings	  Syria.	  Amidst	   the	  struggle	  to	  protect	   their	   families	  and	  meet	  basic	  needs,	  
individuals	  increasingly	  turned	  to	  Da’ish	  and	  other	  groups	  as	  a	  means	  of	  protection	  
against	  the	  serious	  changes	  impacting	  –	  and	  indeed	  restricting	  –	  the	  ability	  of	  people	  
to	   live	   their	   lives	   state.	   Tripp’s	   ideas	   of	   performative	   acts	   of	   resistance	   become	  
increasingly	  important	  in	  these	  times	  and	  such	  socio-­‐economic	  dislocations	  result	  in	  
violent	  outbursts	  that	  result	   from	  periods	  of	  dramatic	  change.84	  The	  early	   issues	  of	  
their	   magazine,	   Dabiq,	   stressed	   the	   group’s	   involvement	   within	   the	   fabric	   of	   the	  
region,	   including	   attempts	   to	   secure	   the	   support	   of	   prominent	   tribes.	   With	   the	  
conflict	   in	   Syria	   continuing,	   the	   protection	   offered	   by	   Da’ish	   proved	   appealing	   to	  
many,	  even	  if	  the	  ideology	  was	  repugnant.	  Elsewhere	  I	  have	  argued	  of	  the	  need	  to	  
characterise	  different	  types	  of	  support	  within	  the	  group	  and	  it	  appears	  clear	  that	  for	  
many	  in	  Syria	  fleeing	  Assad’s	  barrel	  bombs,	  this	  is	  purely	  token	  support.85	  
The	  Circle	  of	  Bare	  Life	  
At	   the	   start	   of	   this	   paper	   I	   set	   out	   to	   document	   the	   rise	   of	   Hizballah	   from	   the	  
conditions	  of	  chaos	  and	  bare	  life	  in	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  Lebanon.	  By	  positioning	  it	  as	  a	  
resistance	  organisation	   and	  given	   the	  power	  of	   the	  Karbala	  narrative,	   the	  Party	  of	  
God	  was	  able	  to	  draw	  support	  from	  large	  numbers	  of	  marginalised	  Shi’a	  residing	  in	  
southern	   Lebanon.	   Muqawamah	   would	   also	   find	   traction	   at	   a	   global	   level,	  
overcoming	  sectarian	  divisions,	  yet	  with	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  conflict	  in	  Syria,	  a	  number	  
of	  challenges	  have	  arisen,	  leaving	  the	  Party	  of	  God	  facing	  existential	  challenges.	  Such	  
an	   approach	   has	   also	   facilitated	   greater	   development	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   bare	   life,	  
which	   involves	   softening	   the	   concept	   beyond	   the	   legal	   structures	   that	   Agamben	  
establishes.	   By	   involving	   socioeconomic	   conditions	   and	   normative	   aspects,	   one	   is	  
able	  to	  provide	  a	  much	  richer	  analysis	  of	  the	  conditions	  exclusion-­‐inclusion	  the	  result	  
in	  bare	  life.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
be3a-­‐11e2-­‐bb35-­‐00144feab7de.html#axzz4FnduWfa7	  and	  Mark	  Mazzetti	  and	  Matt	  Apuzzo,	  
U.S.	  Relies	  Heavily	  on	  Saudi	  Money	  to	  Support	  Syrian	  Rebels	  (The	  New	  York	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Returning	  to	  the	  Party	  of	  God,	  actions	  in	  Syria	  in	  support	  of	  Assad	  have	  fed	  into	  the	  
further	  marginalisation	   of	   Sunni	   communities	   and	   although	   the	   group	  may	   not	   be	  
directly	  responsible,	  it	  is	  complicit	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  bare	  life	  in	  Sunni	  communities.	  
Of	  course,	  there	  are	  geopolitical	  pressures	  that	   force	  Hizballah	  to	  act	   in	  support	  of	  
Assad,	  keeping	  alive	  the	  axis	  of	  resistance.	  In	  doing	  so	  a	  contradiction	  emerges	  at	  the	  
heart	  of	  Hizballah.	  While	  the	  group	  has	   long	  framed	  itself	   in	  terms	  of	  muqawamah	  
and	   as	   being	   the	   protectors	   of	   the	   mustazefin,	   support	   for	   the	   Assad	   regime	  
challenges	  both	  of	   these	  notions,	   striking	  at	   the	  heart	  of	   the	  Party	  of	  God’s	   raison	  
d’etre.	  
Moreover,	  the	  flow	  of	  close	  to	  1.5	  million	  refugees	  into	  Lebanon	  from	  Syria	  will	  only	  
serve	   to	   exacerbate	   societal	   tensions.	  Much	   like	   the	   flow	   of	   Palestinian	   refugees,	  
Syrian	  refugees	  are	  escaping	  a	  war	  zone	  and	  the	  precarious	  life	  that	  allows.	  Lebanese	  
law	  is	  increasingly	  draconian	  with	  regard	  to	  what	  Syrian	  refugees	  are	  able	  to	  do,	  yet	  
for	  anyone	  who	  walks	  the	  streets	  of	  Hamra	  in	  Beirut,	  the	  sight	  of	  children	  begging	  is	  
unavoidable.	  The	  economic	  cost	  upon	  the	  Lebanese	  state	  is	  growing,	  placing	  a	  huge	  
burden	  on	  the	  Lebanese	  economy	  and,	  ultimately,	  will	  lead	  to	  increased	  resentment	  
and	   structural	   violence	   against	   Syrian	   refugees.	   In	   Lebanon,	   the	   consociational	  
system	  of	   government	   has	   cemented	   sectarian	   division	   across	   the	   political	   system	  
yet	   Hizballah	   has	   also	   sought	   to	   position	   itself	   as	   the	   protectors	   of	   the	   umma,	  
transcending	   sectarian	  divisions.	  Of	   course,	   the	  group’s	  action	   in	  Syria	  undermines	  
its	  position.	  In	  playing	  such	  a	  prominent	  role	  in	  supporting	  Assad	  against	  Da’ish	  and	  
Jabhat	   al-­‐Nusra,	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   Hizballah	   also	   sought	   to	   demonstrate	   their	  
importance	  within	  Lebanon,	  protecting	  the	  state	  rather	  than	  the	  sect.	  	  
With	  the	  transition	  of	  Hizballah	  from	  a	  resistance	  organisation	  into	  government,	  this	  
blurring	  of	  borders	  between	  the	  internal	  and	  the	  external	  finds	  additional	  resonance	  
and	  although	  a	  fluid	  interpretation	  of	  bare	  life	  has	  been	  employed,	  it	  appropriately	  
describes	   conditions	   in	   Lebanon.	   Since	   its	   creation	   in	   1982,	   the	   Party	   of	   God	   has	  
transitioned	   from	  a	   resistance	  organisation	   in	   the	   south	  of	   Lebanon	   to	   one	  of	   the	  
strongest	  military	  forces	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  In	  doing	  so,	  Hizballah	  has	  gone	  full	  circle,	  
with	   its	  power	  helping	   to	   create	   the	   conditions	  of	  bare	   life.	  Of	  course,	  others	  also	  
reject	   the	  conditions	  of	   ‘being	   thus’	  as	  we	  saw	  with	   the	  emergence	  of	  Da’ish	   itself	  
and	  the	  circle	  of	  bare	  life	  continues.	  
	  
	  
	  
. 
